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I. INTRODUCTION
Securities law litigation regarding condominium units coupled with
rental arrangements is poised to enter a new and largely uncharted field:
the sale of individual units in the secondary market. Recent case law
suggests that customary, routine practices in condominium resales,
undertaken without deceit or dishonesty, expose unit owners and their real
estate brokers to securities law liabilities that are substantial, wholly
unanticipated, and unwarranted. The negative ramifications on
condominium unit owners, developers, and real estate brokers" may be
serious. Potentially even more important may be the effect on the
development of securities law, due to a number of analytical defects in the
reasoning presented in support of this inappropriate extension of securities
liability.
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The applicability of securities law to condominiums with rental
arrangements (typically though not exclusively in resort locations) is well
established' and unobjectionable. The judicial and administrative standards
leading to that conclusion, however, were developed to address primary
sales, from a condominium developer to the first group of unit purchasers. 2
Only recently has attention been directed to the resale or secondary market,
which in fact is far more important, in terms of frequency and aggregate
volume of transactions. A particular unit may change hands a dozen or
more times over its useful life, yet up to now only the first sale has been
considered.
When standards developed in one context are applied in a superficial
manner to a different context for which they were not designed, the results
can be disturbing. In one particularly unfortunate recent decision, for
example, the Ninth Circuit ruled that an ordinary resale of a single
condominium unit by its owner became subject to securities law merely
because the real estate broker put the buyer in contact with a rental
manager having no affiliation or relationship whatsoever with either the
seller or the broker. 3 Though the plaintiff in that case alleged fraud, the
decision is based on an expansive interpretation of the definition of
"investment contract" and hence is not limited to fraud actions.
Onerous and expensive registration requirements apply to every offer
and sale of a security, and to every broker engaged in securities
I The SEC has taken regulatory action against condominium offerings, and
obtained registration statements for them, since 1967. Peter M. Gunnar, Regulation of
Resort Time-sharing, 57 OR. L. REV. 31, 36 n.24 (1977) (citing Hale Kaanapali
Apartment Hotel Dev. Co., Registration Statement No. 2-25489 (Apr. 13, 1967)).
Commentators have addressed the securities law aspects of condominiums since at
least 1969. Patrick J. Rohan, The Securities Law Implication of Condominium
Marketing Programs Which Feature a Rental Agency or Rental Pool, 2 CONN. L.
REV. 1 (1969); see also David Clurman, Condominiums as Securities: A Current Look,
19 N.Y.L.F. 457 (1976); Lane L. McVey & David R. Murchinson, Comment,
Federal Securities Regulation of Condominiums: A Purchaser's Perspective, 62
GEORGETOWN L. 1403, 1409-10 (1974) (also discussing early SEC no-action letters
on condominiums).
2 See generally Robert C. Art, Securities Law Aspects of Condominium,
Cooperative and 2ieshare Marketing Programs, in POWELL ON THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY, Chap. 54B (1986).
3 Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1457-62 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S.Ct. 1805 (1990). The only subsequent decision to cite the Hocking case resolved its
issue (relating to marketability of title of leaseholds with rental pooling arrangements)
on other grounds, but noted "grave doubts about the correctness of Hocking." Allison
v. Ticor Title Ins., 907 F.2d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 1990).
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transactions, unless a specific exemption applies. 4 Though logic would
dictate that a private sale of a single condominium unit would fall within
some exemption, a detailed examination of the statutes and rules proves
otherwise.5 Moreover, complete honesty and candor in a nonexempt
securities transactions is no defense; those who act merely in innocent
ignorance of the complex and specialized regime of federal securities
regulations are subject to liability. 6 As a result, purchasers of
condominium units who become dissatisfied with their purchases, perhaps
due to a general decline in market prices or other reasons wholly
unconnected to fraud or nondisclosure, will have available an array of civil
liability provisions to rescind or otherwise penalize the unit seller or real
estate broker.7
Analysis of whether such liability is justified involves a number of
issues of more general application and importance to the field of securities
regulation. A primary issue is whether the parties supplying the elements
of an investment contract must be related to each other. Using the classical
phraseology from the Supreme Court's Howey test-an "expect[ation of]
profits.., from the efforts of the promoter or third party" 8-is there an
implicit requirement that the promoter or third party be affiliated or
otherwise connected to the offeror?
Another issue is whether a form of investment that is once correctly
characterized as a security retains that status once it is in the hands of a
4 Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1988) (registration of
securities); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1988)
(registration of securities broker-dealers). Registration of securities and of brokers is
addressed in Section VI of this Article, infra.
5 Many of the exemptions-notably the nonpublic offering, Regulation D, and
intrastate exemptions-are available only to "issuers," a term not likely to include an
individual condominium owner selling a single unit in the resale market (though one
possible interpretation would so classify that person). The formal exemptions such as
Rule 144 are useful only if a lengthy holding period is satisfied. Analysis of the
applicability and practicality of the various exemptions in the condominium resale
context is contained in Section VI.C. of this Article.
6 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1988) (rescission
or damages available for any violation of securities act, without regard to mental state
of defendant); Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker Inc., 925 F.2d 682 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 79 (1991) (mere negligence is sufficient to establish liability under
§ 12(2) for oral misrepresentation).
7 Similar consequences have been noted in other industries. See, e.g., Gordon L.
Allott, Unanticipated Liability of the Landnan, 31 ROCKY MT. L. INST. 21-1, 21-23
(1985); John Cooper, Win, Place or Show Through Multiple Ownership of
Thoroughbreds in Alabama, 15 CUMB. L. REV. 317, 318 n.35 (1985).
8 S.E.C. v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 298, reh'g denied, 329 U.S. 819 (1946).
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different party. Stated otherwise, does the intuitively attractive formula
"once a security, always a security" withstand analysis?
Finally, the position of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
on these issues deserves attention. Through a large number of Releases,
"No-Action Letters," and amicus briefs, the SEC has established policies
of substantial practical importance to parties involved in condominium
sales.
This Article will address each of those issues, after first establishing
the basic framework of analysis derived from the leading Supreme Court
precedents in the field, and recent circuit court case law directly addressing
securities aspects of condominium resales. Case law created the problem,
and can cure it, if analytical defects in recent decisions are recognized and
rejected. Alternately, legislative and administrative solutions are proposed.
11. CASE LAW ON CONDOMINIUMS AS SECURITIES
Case law explicating the characteristics of an "investment contract,"
one of the terms within the statutory definition of "security," 9 leaves no
doubt that real estate offerings meeting those characteristics are included.
9 The key definition is:
§ 2. When used in this title, unless the context otherwise requires-
(1) the term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
ights... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as
a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary
or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1); 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976). The definition in the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976), -is
virtually identical, and the two are interpreted the same. See Marine Bank v. Weaver,
455 U.S. 551, 556 n.3 (1982); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336-43 (1967).
Particular attention is warranted to the words "unless the context otherwise
requires" in the opening clause, and the terms "stock" and "investment contract." The
"context" has been interpreted as referring to the context of an investment transaction,
rather than the statute, leading to an analysis of whether an investment instrument that
in isolation would not be a security should be considered a security because it is
offered in conjunction with other interests. See e.g., United Housing Foundation v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
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Tangible property of any type, 10 ranging from earthworm farms11 and
thoroughbred horses 12 to cosmetics marketing franchises 13 are investment
contracts and hence securities, if coupled with management arrangements.
Though not "investment contracts" when consider~d in isolation, 14
condominium units fall into that classification when offered in conjunction
with rental services. 15
A. The Framework for Analysis: Supreme Court Interpretations of
"Investment Contracts"
A brief review of the very few Supreme Court rulings on the definition
of the term investment contract is useful to establish the core principles
applicable to the issue of condominium sales and resales. Three decisions
directly involved real estate interests alleged to constitute investment
contracts. Two others are useful also, though less directly on point.
10 See, e.g., Bell v. Health-Mor, Inc., 549 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977) (vacuum
cleaners); S.E.C. v. Continental Commodities, 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974)
(managed customer accounts at brokerage firms); Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group,
Inc., 494 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1974) (chinchillas); Glen-Arden Commodities v.
Costantino, 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974) (scotch whisky); S.E.C. v. Glenn W.
Turner Enterprises, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973) (self-
improvement courses); Continental Marketing Corp. v. S.E.C., 387 F.2d 466 (10th
Cir. 1967) (beavers); S.E.C. v. Payne, 35 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (silver
foxes); Holloway v. Thompson, 42 N.E.2d 421 (Ind. App. 1942) (cemetery lots). In
each of these situations, the tangible property was coupled with some managerial
services.
11 Smith v. Gross, 604 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1979).
12 See generally Cooper, supra note 7.
13 S.E.C. v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
14 See, e.g., De Luz Ranchos Inv. v. Coldwell Banker & Co., 608 F.2d 1297,
1301 (9th Cir. 1979) (when seller's only obligation is to transfer title to land, no
security is involved); Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d 1023, 1025 (10th Cir. 1978)
(mere transfer of title to land does not involve a security). The Securities and
Exchange Commission agrees. Ray Garrett Jr., former chairman of the SEC, stated
that "[I]nterests in property are not ordinarily securities. We have nothing to do with
the normal buying and selling of interests in property, and we don't want to have
anything to do with it." Address by Ray Garrett, Jr., before the San Diego Mortgage
Bankers Ass'n, July 4, 1974, quoted in Alan M. Berman & Andrew D. Stone, Federal
Securities Law and the Sale of Condominiums, Homes and Homesites, 30 Bus. LAW.
411, 425 (1975). The two-judge majority in the Hocking case conceded that "real
estate, without more" is not a security, but then found that more was involved in the
particular transaction. 839 F.2d 560, 564-66 (9th Cir. 1988).
15 Art, supra note 2, at 54B-13; George K. Chamberlin, Annotation, What
Interests in Real Estate Are "Securities" Within Meaning of § 3(a)(1O) of Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.S. § 78c(a)(10), 52 A.L.R. FED. 146, 164 (1981).
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The earliest decision, in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing,16 (hereinafter
Joiner) emphasized the marketing approach used by the promoter. The
Supreme Court accorded key importance to the contents of the advertising
and "sales literature," quoting extensively from letters sent by the
promoter to the prospective investors. 17 The decision, however, did not
enumerate the component elements of an investment contract.
The framework for most subsequent interpretation of the term
"security" was established three years later, in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.18
(hereinafter Howey), a 1946 decision concerning the marketing of what was
ostensibly an interest in real estate. The Howey Company had offered
investors fee simple in long narrow strips of land in a Florida orange
grove-an interest that in isolation would not be a security. 19
Concurrently, however, a closely affiliated company had offered a
"service contract," which for practical purposes was necessary to make the
real estate interest economically feasible and attractive to investors. The
service company would manage the property, pick and market the fruit,
and distribute the profits to the owners. Of key importance to later
decisions was the fact that the fruit from all of the strips would be
commingled or "pooled," so that the economic return to each owner would
depend on the profitability of the enterprise as a whole, rather than the
production of the specific trees owned by each investor.20
The Supreme Court ruled that the combination in the offer 2' of the fee
simple and the service contract constituted an "investment contract," even
though the real estate had intrinsic value apart from the management
services. 22 The Howey decision's formulation, which has come to be
16 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
17 Id. at 346 & n.3.
18 328 U.S. 293, reh'g denied, 329 U.S. 819 (1946).
19 Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.
2 0 Id. at 300. Pooling is important to the issue of whether "vertical commonality"
is sufficient to establish the existence of a security, or whether "horizontal
commonality" is necessary.
21 Even investors who chose to purchase the land without the contract were held
to be protected by the securities laws, because the laws prohibit offers as well as sales
of unregistered securities. Id. at 300-01.
22 The key language, the basis for extensive exigesis in the subsequent lower
court decisions, defined an investment contract as:
... a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in
a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise
are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests in the physical assets
employed in the enterprise....
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known as the "economic realities test," classifies an interest as a security
only if the three elements are concurrently present:
(1) "an investment of money;" in
(2) "a common enterprise" (with divergence of authority as to the
meaning of commonality); and
(3) "an expectation of profits solely from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party" (but note that the term "solely" was
subsequently deleted, as explained below).23
Only one subsequent Supreme Court case has dealt directly with the issue
of whether real estate interests are securities. United Housing Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman24 (hereinafter Fonnan) concerned stock in a state-
subsidized housing cooperative, entitling the stockholder to lease an
apartment in the building. In a split decision, the Court ruled that no
security was present.
First focusing on the term "stock," one of the items listed in the
statutory definition of security, the Court determined that the cooperative
shares did not qualify because they lacked the conventional characteristics
of stock.25 Next, focusing on the "investment contract" term in the
statutory list,26 the Court applied the Howey test. The third element,
... . If that test be satisfied, it is immaterial whether the enterprise is
speculative or non-speculative or whether there is a sale of property with or
without intrinsic value.
Id. at 298-99, 301.
23 Id. at 299, 301.
24 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
25 The shares were not transferable except to the cooperative itself, which would
merely refund the original purchase price, making appreciation in value to the
shareholder impossible. The owners had voting rights, but on the basis of one vote per
apartment rather than one vote per share (even though larger apartments required the
purchase of more shares). No dividends would be paid. For these reasons, the Court
determined that the shares were not "stock" in the statutory sense, even though they
had been given that label. "[Florm should be disregarded for substance and the
emphasis should be on economic reality." See id. at 850 n.15 (quoting Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)).
26 This characterization of the Fornan decision is based on subsequent Supreme
Court explanations in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
Ambiguities in Forman provided considerable support for the view that the Howey
factors applied to all types of securities, not merely investment contracts, and
[V/ol. 53:413
1992] SECURITIES PROBLEMS IN CONDOMINIUM RESALES 421
"expectation of profits" was absent, the Court determined, because the
marketing program had not emphasized the investment benefits of
ownership, and the arrangement in fact excluded the possibility of profit.27
Forman is significant also for its modification of the Howey formula's
reference to "profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or third
parties." 28 Though that phrase was appropriate to the particular facts of the
Howey case,29 a literal application would allow promoters to escape
securities law virtually at will, merely by requiring investors to perform
token efforts, perhaps of a ministerial nature.30 The Supreme Court in
underlied the entire "sale of business controversy" finally resolved in Landreth
Timber.
27 The purchasers were "motivated by a desire to use or consume the item
purchased," not to profit from it. Accordingly, the majority in Forman concluded that
the offering was not an investment contract and not a security. The majority rejected
the argument of the dissenting justices that savings in housing costs due to state
subsidies and tax benefits were equivalent to profit. Fornan, 421 U.S. at 852-55.
28 Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. Elsewhere in the same opinion, referring to earlier
case law from state courts regarding the phrase "investment contract," the Court used
the terminology "solely through the efforts of the promoter or some one other than
themselves." Id. at 298.
29 The Howey investors were offered strips of citrus groves plus a service
contract. The Supreme Court noted that "[i]ndividual development of the plots of land
that are offered and sold would seldom be economically feasible due to their small
size. Such tracts gain utility as citrus groves only when cultivated and developed as
component parts of a larger area." Id. at 300. The offerees were professional and
business people from distant localities, lacking the knowledge, skill, and equipment
requisite to cultivation, harvesting, and marketing citrus products. Therefore, they
would be unable to derive any benefit from their investment unless they purchased a
service contract. Id. at 296, 300.
30 For example, in two cases involving the same operator of pyramid schemes,
investors were required to expend some efforts, such as bringing new potential
investors to sales meetings. All key aspects of the marketing program, sales
techniques, and product, however, were controlled by the promoter. Both courts
declined to apply the Howey "solely" term literally, disregarded the incidental efforts
of the investors, and deemed the investments to be securities. The only efforts to be
considered were "the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise." S.E.C. v. Glenn W. Turner
Enterprises, 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); accord
S.E.C. v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 483 (5th Cir. 1974); see also
Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 240 n.4 (4th
Cir. 1988); S.E.C. v. Professional Assoc., 731 F.2d 349, 357 (6th Cir. 1984);
Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 103 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831
(1984); Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Fargo
Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 1976). One commentator has
suggested that the origin of the view eliminating the term "solely" was merely a
judicial attempt to apply securities law when it did not directly apply, to penalize a
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Forman referred instead to "profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial
or managerial efforts of others," 31 effectively deleting the word "solely"
from the Howey formula. 32 One of the other component elements of the
Howey test, "common enterprise," has no authoritative Supreme Court
interpretation, 33 and so remains problematic in condominium situations as
in many others. The circuit courts are split on the issue of which types of
relationships provided the necessary commonality. 34 One point of general
agreement is that the requirement is satisfied by "horizontal commonality":
sharing of risk and profits among two or more investors. 35
clear fraud, and thus "demonstrating the truth of the old maxim that hard cases made
bad law." James S. Mofsky, Some Comments on the Expanding Definition of
"Security," 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 405 (1973).
31 Forman, 421 U.S. at 852.
32 Piambino v. Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306, 1317 n.18 (5th Cir. 1980) (Supreme Court
has "read the word 'solely' out of the Howey test.... ."); Willamson v. Tucker, 645.
F.2d 404, 418 (5th Cir.) (word "solely" omitted from Supreme Court test of
investment contract), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
33 The Court has declined to review the split in the lower courts. Mordaunt v.
Incomco, 469 U.S. 1115, 1116 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) (certiorari should be
granted to resolve split in authority among the circuits). One Supreme Court decision
lent some support to the view that the more stringent horizontal commonality is
necessary. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559-60 (1982) (an agreement to
provide one party a share of the other party's profits from operation of a business was
a "unique agreement negotiated one-on-one," not involving any other investors, and
not constituting a security.) As one commentator concluded, after a detailed review of
the case law, "[t]he requisite commonality to satisfy Howey's common enterprise
element appears to remain an open question." Marc I. Steinberg & William E.
Kaulbach, The Supreme Court and the Definition of "Security': The "Context" Cause,
"Investment Contract" Analysis, and Their Ramifications, 40 VAND. L. REV. 489,
520-21 (1987).
34 For analysis of the differing positions, see Susan G. Flanagan, Comment, The
Common Enterprise Element of the Howey Test, 18 PAC. L.J. 1141, 1150-58 (1987).
35 See, e.g., Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 33, at 519 ("Generally, all courts
hold that horizontal commonality (which looks to the relationship between an
individual investor and the pool of other investors) meets this element of the Howey
test.") The Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits require horizontal commonality. Curran
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 622 F.2d 216, 223-25 (6th Cir. 1980)
(commonality requires a relationship among investors exemplified by pooling of funds
or pro rata distribution of profits); Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96,
101 (7th Cir. 1977) (discretionary futures trading account was not a security because
only one investor was involved); Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274,
278 (7th Cir.) (there must be more than one investor, and some kind of joint
participation or dependency between investors must be present), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 887 (1972); Wasnowic v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066, 1069 (M.D.
Pa. 1972), aff'd mem., 491 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 994
(1974). In the First Circuit, horizontal commonality was accepted by a district court.
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The disagreement is whether "common enterprise" is established
merely by proof of "vertical commonality," which relates to the
relationship between the promoter and the investor. According to many
courts, the element is fulfilled if the promoter shares profit and risk with
the investor, even though there may be only one investor.3 6 An alternate,
more liberal interpretation of "vertical commonality" is satisfied if the
investor's return is dependent on the expertise of the promoter whether or
not the promoter's profits are tied to the investor's, and whether or not
there is more than one investor. 37 The Supreme Court has not directly
ruled on the various interpretations of commonality.
Holtzman v. Proctor, Cook & Co., 528 F. Supp. 9, 15 (D. Mass. 1981). Even in
these circuits, however, a court might discuss vertical commonality. See, e.g., Stenger
v. R.H. Love Galleries, Inc., 741 F.2d 144, 147 (7th Cir. 1984) (arrangement
between seller and buyer of paintings involved only one buyer so lacked horizontal
commonality, but also resulted in differing financial interests of the two parties so
lacked vertical commonality); Flanagan, Comment, supra note 34, at 1152-53. One
criticism of insistence on horizontal commonality is that "it makes no sense to penalize
the single investor simply because he happens to be alone in his misfortune." Walsh v.
International Precious Metals Corp., 510 F. Supp. 867, 871 (D. Utah 1981).
36 The Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits accept strict vertical
commonality, in which the fortunes of an investor are inextricably tied to the success
of the promoter, without necessarily any pooling with other investors. McGill v.
American Land & Exploration Co., 776 F.2d 923, 925 (10th Cir. 1985) (joint venture
for real estate development is a security, as horizontal commonality is not required);
Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1115 (1985); Meyer v. Thomas & McKinnon Auchincloss Kohlmeyer, Inc., 686 F.2d
818, 819 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1023 (1983); Brodt v. Bache & Co.,
595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978) (discretionary commodities trading account did not
satisfy the common enterprise element because fortunes of promoter and investor were
not mutually dependent); Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414, 418
(8th Cir. 1974); El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir.)
(either horizontal or vertical commonality satisfies the requirement), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 900 (1974); Commercial Iron & Metal Co. v. Bache & Co., 478 F.2d 39, 42
(10th Cir. 1973) (discretionary commodities trading account was a security if
promoter promised to make all investment decisions and earn large profits); SEC v.
Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 821 (1973).
37 Two Fifth Circuit decisions are the best examples of the liberal commonality
position. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 485 (5th Cir. 1974)
(pyramid marketing scheme was a security even though each investor's success
depended in part on that investor's own efforts because the essential managerial efforts
were provided by the promoter); SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d
516, 522 (5th Cir. 1974) (relationship between broker and a single customer satisfies
the commonality requirement; "[lhe critical factor is not the similitude or coincidence
of investor input, but rather the uniformity of impact of the promoter's efforts"
(quoting Koscot, 497 F.2d at 478)). The rationale is that an investor who lacks the
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The two most recent Supreme Court decisions on the definition of a
security merit brief mention for their possible effect on condominium
resales, though they do not directly relate to real estate. In Marine Bank v.
Weaver,38 the Court reviewed a private business arrangement between a
bank and the guarantor of a loan. 39 According to the Court, "this unique
agreement, negotiated one-on-one by the parties, [was] not a security." 4°
Because sales of condominiums in the secondary market typically involve
the owner of a single condominium unit privately negotiating a transaction
with a single buyer, Marine Bank v. Weaver suggests that the situation
does not involve a security.
That interpretation is unreliable, however, in light of the Supreme
Court's subsequent decision, in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth,41
substantially undercutting or limiting its decision in Marine Bank. The
Landreth Timber case stands for the proposition that stock is always a
security (if it has the traditional attributes of stock) regardless of the
transactional context. Thus even privately negotiated one-on-one sales
might be securities. The Court emphatically and specifically limited its
opinion to stock, however, disclaiming any ruling relating to investment
contracts. 42
These precedents, particularly Howey and Forman, provide the most
authoritative criteria for analysis of whether real estate interests constitute a
"security." Lower-court decisions and SEC positions are valid to the extent
that they are reconcilable with the Supreme Court authority and the statute.
B. Application to Condominiums: The Central Importance of Rental
Arrangements and "Pooling"
In a usual condominium transaction, the first element of the Howey
test-investment of money-is plainly satisfied by the payment of the
purchase price. The more difficult issues are whether the purchaser is led
knowledge and skill to protect himself or herself deserves the protection of the
securities laws. A persuasive opposing viewpoint is that even knowledgeable investors
deserve protection from fraud. Flanagan, Comment, supra note 34, at 1157.
38 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
39 A couple who had purchased a $50,000 certificate of deposit from a bank
pledged it to the bank to guarantee a bank loan to third parties. The third parties agree
to pay the guarantors 50% of its profits and $100 per month for the duration of the
guarantee, and to allow the guarantors to use the third party's horses, barn and
pasture. Id. at 552-53.
4 Id. at 560.
41 471 U.S. 681 (1985); accord, Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985)
(decided the same day; involved sale of 50% of a corporation's stock).42 Landreth Timber, 471 U.S. at 690.
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to expect profits from the managerial efforts of others and whether the
purchaser is involved in a common enterprise. A closely related issue is
whether, under the Joiner approach, the promoter's publicity and
promotional efforts emphasize the economic benefits rather than the
suitability of the condominium unit as a personal residence for the buyer.43
In practical application, the analysis typically centers on arrangements for
unit owners to rent their units.
Expectation of profits from certain sources can be disregarded when
determining whether a transaction in real estate involves a security. Most
importantly, appreciation in the value of the real estate (depending on the
vagaries of the real estate market) does not satisfy the test. 44 Also, courts
43 See, e.g., United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 854 (1975)
(developer's "information statement" emphasized residential benefits and provided no
basis for expectation of profits); Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d
1036, 1039 (10th Cir. 1980) (promises that developer's activities would result in
increase in values of lots); De Luz Ranchos Inv., Ltd. v. Caldwell Banker & Co., 608
F.2d 1297, 1301 (9th Cir. 1979) (promoter's references to future construction of
nearby facilities and amenities were too generalized to create any specific expectations
by investors); Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d 1023, 1025 (10th Cir. 1978)
(developer stated plans for future development but contracted only for sale of land, not
creating a security); McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 210 (10th Cir. 1975); Happy
Inv. Group v. Lakeworld Properties, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 175, 180-81 (N.D. Cal. 1975)
(developer's literature and sales talks gave an impression that developer would exert
substantial efforts to build a subdivision, but was devoid of any concrete promises or
plans, and so did not lead to classification as a security).
44 Grenader v. Spitz, 537 F.2d 612, 618 (2d Cir.) (stating that every purchaser of
real estate, including a single-family residence, is aware that "he may eventually sell
his property at a profit or loss depending on the vagaries of the real estate
market, .. ." but that fact does not by itself make real estate a security), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1009 (1976); Bender v. Continental Towers Ltd. Partnership, 632 F. Supp.
497, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (expectation of appreciation in value not sufficient to cause
condominiums to be securities even though developer's marketing strategies would
marginally affect those values); Mosher v. Southridge Assocs., Inc., 552 F. Supp.
1226, 1230 (W.D. Penn. 1982) ("profit by appreciation earned through the retention
of real estate" does not make a condominium a security); Johnson v. Nationwide
Indus., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 948, 953 (N.D. Ill. 1978) ("expectation of appreciation in
value" does not make a condominium a security when developer did not agree to rent
the units or provide any services other than management of such facilities as the
garage). In other contexts as well, case law has made clear that expectation of market
price increases does not satisfy the Howey test element of "expectation of profit from
the efforts of others." See, e.g., SEC v. Belmont Reid & Co., 794 F.2d 1388, 1391
(9th Cir. 1986) (gold coins); Noa v. Key Futures, Inc., 638 F.2d 77, 79-80 (9th Cir.
1980) (silver bars); Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253
F. Supp. 359, 366-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (sugar futures). Nevertheless, to avoid even
any unfavorable inference, some commentators have suggested that developers of
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have tended to assign little or no importance to incidental sources of
income, such as receipts from laundry machines or small stores maintained
primarily for the convenience of residents. 45 Similarly, income tax benefits
that are available to all owners of real estate are disregarded, even though
they are obtained only because the development was properly planned and
structured by the developer's tax experts.46
The only profits likely to cause a residential condominium to be a
security derive from rentals during periods in which the owners do not
occupy them. Arrangements to facilitate and manage rentals can make the
investment considerably more attractive to potential purchasers,
particularly in the context of condominiums in resort areas, which the
owners expect to use as vacation accommodations rather than permanent
residences.47
Almost any type of rental arrangement offered by the developer or an
affiliate of the developer satisfies the "efforts of others" element of the
Howey test. When the unit owner depends on the rental manager's efforts
to advertise and otherwise promotes the property for rental, clean and
maintain the premises, and collect and disburse the rental revenue, there
seems little doubt that the investor is relying on the managerial efforts of
others for profit.
timeshare condominiums restrict the ability of unit purchasers to resell at a profit.
David M. Fields, Real Estate Interests as Investment Contracts: An Update and a New
Application-The Shared-Equity Program, 12 REAL EST. L.J. 307, 313 (1984); Joseph
Win. Byrne, Securities Regulation of Tme-Sharing Resort Condominiums, 7 REAL
EsT. L.J. 3, 8-9 (1978).
45 Forman, 421 U.S. at 855-57 (income from professional offices, parking
facilities, and washing machines was used to reduce rental costs, and did not raise the
"expectation of profits" necessary to a security), but see 421 U.S. at 860-62
(Brennan, ., dissenting); Grenader, 537 F.2d at 617 (receipts from coin-operated
laundry and cable television, used to reduce maintenance charges of residents, could
not have created an expectation of profits or dividends); Joyce v. Ritchie Tower
Properties, 417 F. Supp. 53, 55 (N.D. Il. 1976) (allegation of expectation of
"'income' from the various concessions which were to be located in the building"
insufficient to establish that condominium was a security); see also Securities Act
Release No. 5347, [1972-73 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,163. Use
of incidental income (such as from laundry machines) to reduce maintenance
assessments, rather than to distribute in a form comparable to dividends reinforces the
conclusion that the purchaser has no expectation of profits. Id.; see also Robert F.
Vargo, Real Estate Transactions: The Existence of a Federal Security, 14 CUMB. L.
REV. 301, 315-16 (1984).
46 Forman, 421 U.S. at 855. But see id. at 862-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47 Robert D. Rosenbaum, The Resort Condominium and the Federal Securities
Laws-A Case Study in Governmental Inflexibility, 60 VA. L. REV. 785, 785-87
(1974) (also noting certain tax benefits if a condominium unit is owned as an activity
engaged in for profit); Gunnar, supra note 1; Rohan, supra note 1, at 1-3.
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When applying the "common enterprise" element, however,
considerably more attention to the specific structure of the arrangement is
necessary. The issue of whether expenses and income are "pooled" is
particularly important, even critical. In the non-pooled arrangement, the
rental manager maintains separate accounts for each condominium unit,
managing it as agent for its owner and charging a fee for the service. The
unit owner's return depends directly on the number of days that the
particular unit was rented.
Although this approach can be successful, problems can arise because
the agent typically has the same agreement with the owners of many of the
units within a single development. Indeed, advertising, office overhead,
and other management expenses typically make the rental service
economically unfeasible unless a large number of units are under common
management. Those expenses must be allocated to all participating owners
in a fair manner. Also, when the rental demand is not sufficient to keep all
units occupied, the available guests must be assigned to units in such a way
as to keep both the guests and all unit owners satisfied. 48
To minimize these difficulties, rental arrangements are commonly
structured through "rental pool agreements," 49 commonly referred to as
"RPAs." The manager maintains the units belonging to all participating
owners and rents them out with the goal of maximizing total income of the
pool. After all administrative expenses are paid, each individual unit owner
receives a percentage of the profits from the entire pool, rather than
proceeds from the rental of his or her particular unit.50 In some
condominium developments, participation in the RPA is mandatory. 51
The pooling feature provides "horizontal commonality," in that the
risks and returns of the venture are shared by many investors. A
condominium with an RPA bears a strong parallel to the facts in the Howey
case, in which the fruit from all of the small strips of land was pooled, and
the net income received by each owner depended on the success of the
overall venture rather than the production from the particular trees owned
by each owner.
Non-pooled rental arrangements, in contrast, do not provide horizontal
commonality because each unit owner receives income based only on rental
of that owner's own unit. This type of arrangement can satisfy the Howey
"common enterprise" element only in jurisdictions that accept the "vertical
48 See generally Rosenbaum, supra note 47, at 786.
49 Id. at 786, (citing Recreation Ventures, Registration Statement No. 2-45795;
The Ranch at Roaring Fork, Inc., Registration Statement No. 2-46633; Sundial
Associates, Registration Statement No. 2-45433; Carlton House Resort Inns, Inc.,
Registration Statement No. 2-46257.)50 Id.
51 Id.
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commonality" interpretation, which focuses not on relationships among
investors but rather on the relationship of a particular investor with the
promoter.
I A Fifth Circuit decision 52 illustrates the importance of the distinction.
The case involved a condominium campground in which management
arranged to rent camping sites to tourists, accounting separately for the
rents earned on each owner's camping site. The circuit courts requiring
horizontal commonality would have found no security.53 The Fifth Circuit
came to the opposite conclusion, however, ruling that a security was
present because each owner's success depended on the manager's
SUCCesS. 54
Another factual circumstance identified as important is the extent of
participation by the developer. If the developer merely offered rental
brokerage services on an optional and nonexclusive basis in conjunction
with other real estate brokers, the arrangement would not constitute a
security. 55
If rental services are provided through a condominium owners
association, the provision for shifting control of the association from the
developer to owners after a sufficient number of units are -sold is
important. If the unit purchasers are granted ultimate control over the
investment, or can meaningfully participate in essential managerial
decisions, then the requisite reliance on the efforts of the promoter is
lacking, and the real estate interest is not a security.56 The unit purchasers
may choose to delegate their responsibility to a managing agent, perhaps
even the original promoter, without losing their power of control. 57
Though the content of an offer must be judged as of the time of the
offer, analysis of the extent of decision-making power to be retained by a
condominium owner must focus on the time period after the unit owner
52 Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of Am., Inc., 608 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1979).
53 Vargo, supra note 45, at 310-11.
54 Cameron, 608 F.2d at 193 (profits were "inextricably wedded" to the success
of outdoor resorts, rental business, including its advertising and management.)
55 Byrne, supra note 44, at 8. In its last "no-action letter". on timeshares before
the Commission discontinued the issuance of letters on timeshare questions, the SEC
staff opined that no security was present in an arrangement to rent timeshare units
when the managing agent was selected by the unit owners directly, not the promoter,
and arrangement was optional. The Innisfree Corp. SEC No-Action Letter, [1973
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,398 (May 7, 1973).
56 Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 741 (11th Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1203 (1983); Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp. 540 F.2d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 1976)
(investor who had right to fire the managers had ultimate control).57 Vargo, supra note 45, at 319 (citing Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736 (11th Cir.
1982)).
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chooses to participate in a rental arrangement. The Howey decision made
clear that an offer of a real estate interest and a managerial services
contract involved a security, even though the contract was optional. The
critical factor was that the contract, if accepted, would deprive the real
estate owner of control. 5 8 The opposite conclusion is justified if the
contract, if accepted, would not deprive the real estate owner of control.
For example, 'a provision in a condominium rental arrangement allowing
the participating unit owner to cancel the contract at any time, or to fire the
rental manager, tends to support the conclusion that no security is
involved. 59
C. Secondary Transactions in Condominiums: The Limited Case Law
The issue of whether securities law applies to the resale of a single
condominium unit by its owner in the secondary market had never, until
recently, received specific attention in either case law or SEC rules. The
one case to squarely address that issue, therefore, merits close attention.
The case of Hocking v. Dubois,60 decided by the Ninth Circuit en banc in
1989, represents the best available guidance for a market that, up to now,
had proceeded without concern for securities regulation.
The Hocking case concerned a condominium unit in a relatively new
Honolulu resort complex. When the developer of the complex sold the
units, all of the elements of an investment contract were present. The
developer promoted the real estate together with optional participation in a
rental pool agreement with a different company with which the developer
had made an arrangement. Rental income from all participating units would
be combined into a single "pool," and then divided proportionately among
all participants, regardless of differences in the income generated by each
58 Robert B. Brannen, Jr., Comment, The Economic Realities of Condominium
Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 19 GA. L. REV. 747, 769 n.96 (1985).
59 The use of managers in property investments does not render them investment
contracts if the investors maintain sufficient control over selection and termination of
the manager. Deutsch Energy Co. v. Mazur, 813 F.2d 1567, 1570 (9th Cir. 1987);
Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 741-42 (lth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1203 (1983); De Luz Ranchos Inv., Ltd. v. Coldwell Banker & Co., 608 F.2d 1297,
1301 (9th Cir. 1979); Fargo Partners, 540 F.2d at 915; Perry v. Gammon, 583 F.
Supp. 1230, 1232-33 (N.D. Ga. 1984). In the Hocking situation, each condominium
unit holder retained complete control over selection of a rental agent (though
realistically, agents other than the one arranged by the developer might not be
interested). Unlike the Howey situation, there were no facts suggesting that the
plaintiff in Hocking would be deprived of the value of their real estate if they declined
to enter into a service contract with a particular company.
60 885 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1078 (1990).
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specific condominium unit. As a result, the arrangement provided
horizontal commonality, and expectation of profits from the efforts of
others arranged for by the promoter, satisfying the Howey test.61
The developer sold one of the units to an Arizona couple named
Liberman, who did not elect to enter into the RPA and had no connection
with the rental manager. Approximately one year later, the Libermans
resold the unit to Hocking, the plaintiff. The Libermans' contract of sale
did not purport to transfer any rights in the RPA, was not conditioned on
the purchaser participating in the RPA, and indeed was completely silent
regarding the RPA. Hence, what the Libermans sold was exclusively real
estate, devoid of any management services. Perhaps for that reason, the
plaintiff purchaser did not assert any securities law claims against the
Libermans.
Hocking, the purchaser, later became dissatisfied with the appreciation
in value of the condominium, and brought a securities fraud action under
Rule lOb-5. Hocking named as defendants the real estate broker that had
arranged the sale, and the brokerage company for which she worked.
Conspicuously absent from the list of defendants were the sellers of the
unit (the Libermans), the condominium developer, and the RPA manager.
Hocking alleged that the real estate brokers had promoted the
availability of the RPA as an inducement to purchase the condominium unit
and in the process misrepresented certain key facts (such as the amount of
rental income that could be expected). 62 Hocking further alleged that he
would not have purchased the condominium if the RPA had not been
available, and that in fact he did enter into the rental pool approximately
two weeks after his purchase.
The federal district court dismissed the case on the ground that no
security was involved. A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit, in a split
decision, reversed and remanded, finding that a security was present.63
61 All judges on the Ninth Circuit correctly noted that the developer offered and
sold a security, though that transaction was not at issue in the case. Id. at 1456
(majority); id. at 1462 (Norris, J., dissenting).
62 Other alleged misrepresentations, mentioned in the decision of the three-judge
panel but not in the en banc decision, concerned the prior ownership of the
condominium unit, and the efforts that the brokers were making to again resell the
condo on behalf of the plaintiffs. 839 F.2d 560, 563 (9th Cir. 1988) (petition for
rehearing withdrawn December 7, 1988).
63 Id. The two-judge majority held "that the offer of a condominium with an
option to participate in a rental pool arrangement constitutes the offer of an investment
contract under the securities laws." Id. at 563. The fact that the rental arrangement
was offered by the developer's rental manager, not by the Libermans, was held to be
insignificant. According to the court, the key is "what tangible bundle of rights was
actually offered to or purchased by the buyer, not who offered or sold those rights to
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(The flawed reasoning of the majority, essentially holding that once an
investment vehicle satisfies the requirements to be a security it retains that
status even when conditions change, is discussed in the following section
of this article.) Subsequently, however, that opinion was withdrawn and
the Ninth Circuit granted the defendants' petition for rehearing en banc,
64
a rare occurence.
The Ninth Circuit en banc decision was deeply divided, reflecting the
difficulty of the issue and the lack of directly applicable precedent. Six of
the eleven judges-a slim majority-ruled that a security was present.
Their rationale was completely different, and more defensible, than the one
asserted by the majority of the three-judge panel below, but still flawed. In
him." Id. at 569. The court's reference to an "option" to participate in an RPA
certainly was not intended in the common-law sense of an offer that was irrevocable
by contract for a period of time. The broker had no capacity, and did not purport, to
bind the RPA manager. Apparently the court was using the term "option" to mean a
mere possibility that the plaintiff could approach a rental manager, who was not in any
sense a party to the contract between the seller and the plaintiff, to ask whether the
rental manager would be interested in entering into a separate contract.
That extreme position is avoided, however, because the Ninth Circuit hedged on
the critical fact. The majority stated at the outset of its opinion that there was a
genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of an "option," and that, for
purposes of the motion for summary judgment, it would assume that an option was
offered. Id. at 562 n.1. The allegations cited by the two judges, however, support only
the position that the purchaser desired rental services, not, as the judges stated, that he
received an option for them. In footnote 1 of their opinion, the majority points to the
allegation that the purchaser "[w]as informed of the availability of the rental pool
arrangement by Dubois, and that he would not have purchased the condominium
without the option. Further, within two weeks of purchasing the condominium,
Hocking entered into the rental pool arrangement." Id. None of these allegations
support the conclusion for which they are cited. Id. at 572 (Hug, J., dissenting)
(noting also that the record contained no evidence suggesting that either the Libermans
ever had a transferable option or that the real estate agent Dubois ever offered one to
Hocking). Being "informed of the availability" of the RPA seems quite different from
receiving an option, especially when the RPA was operated by a person not a party to,
and not mentioned in, the condominium sale contract. Even the SEC takes the position
that "mere notice of the existence of rental services ... does not make the
condominium offering one of securities." North Shore Project, SEC No-Action Letter,
summarized in See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 194 at C-2 (March 21, 1973), cited in
Rosenbaum, supra note 47, at 794 n.35. The SEC staff continues to take the position
that developers can inform potential purchasers of the existence of rental services,
provided that they are not emphasized in the marketing program. See also infra note
135 and accompanying text. Moreover, the plaintiffs subjective state of mind
(wanting to participate in the RPA) and subsequent conduct (entering into the RPA) do
not relate to receipt of an option or an offer of an option, at least in the strict sense.
64 852 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
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a cogent dissent, five judges opposed the application of securities law to
the situation, and two of those five supplemented the arguments for that
position in a second dissent.65 Certiorari to the Supreme Court was sought
but denied. 66 No reported decision after Hocking has squarely addressed
the same issue, though one case from the Seventh Circuit, in dicta,
expressed "grave doubts about the correctness of Hocking."67 Thus the en
banc decision stands as the leading authority on securities law issues in the
secondary condominium market.
1. The "Presented as Part of the Same Transaction" Standard
The Ninth Circuit majority constructed a new standard to guide
application of the Howey test in situations in which management services
and the tangible assets are provided by different parties: the two will be
considered a single "package" if they are presented "as part of the same
transaction or scheme." 68 The fact that the person offering the benefits was
not legally authorized or capable of delivering them was deemed irrelevant
to characterizing the offer.
Applying that approach to the Hocking facts, the majority ruled that
Dubois, the real estate agent, had offered both the rental pool (available
from the rental manager) and the condominium unit (available from the
individual unit owner) as one "package" that satisfied all of the elements of
the Howey test. 69 The conclusion was reached even though the agent,
Dubois, and her principal (the unit owner), had no contract, relationship to
or affiliation with the rental manager.
That holding should give pause to all real estate brokers dealing in
condominiums with associated rental services (commonly in resort areas),
and also to unit owners seeking to resell their units. Though Hocking
asserted liability against only the real estate agent, the precedent will in
65 Hocking, 885 F.2d at 1463-64 (Norris, J., dissenting); id. at 1468 (Wiggins,
I., dissenting).
66 494 U.S. 1078 (1990).
67 Allison v. Ticor Title Ins., 907 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1990). The court described
Hocking as "a 6-5 decision that did not satisfactorily address the question of how a
unit owner who conveys only an interest in real property vends a 'security' just
because the proprietor of the condominium development offers a rental pool in which
unit owners may participate if they choose." Id. at 649. Resolution of that issue,
however, was not necessary to decide the issue before the Seventh Circuit involving
whether a title company had breached a contractual obligation to defend against claims
of unmarketability of certain leases. Said the court, "even if we were to follow
Hocking, the leases would not be 'unmarketable.'" Id.6 8 Hocking, 885 F.2d at 1458.
69 Id.
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other cases apply equally to unit owners marketing their units, whether or
not they use real estate agents. More broadly, the holding has the potential
of diminishing the attraction of resort condominiums by complicating their
resale, thereby causing an unfavorable impact on the sale of resort
condominiums in the first instance.
2. Wrapping the "Package". The Specific Conduct Creating Potential
Liability
The findings of an investment contract is properly based on what is
included in the "offer," a term that in securities law encompasses far more
than what is covered by that term in the common law of contracts. The
remedial purposes of the securities acts, and the ease by which any narrow
definition could be evaded by promoters of securities schemes and, most
importantly, the breadth of statutory definitions of the term, justify a broad
interpretation. Hence the fact that a real estate agent, such as Dubois in the
Hocking case, does not purport to bind the RPA manager, and does not
have the authority or capacity to do so, does not resolve the issue of
whether the RPA is "offered."
In Dubois' case, the determination that the RPA was part of the
"package" offered to the buyer was based on four specific factual
allegations. Close inspection of those acts is warranted to determine what
precisely triggers the application of securities law. Hocking, the plaintiff
buyer, alleged that the real estate agent:
(1) "assured him rental of his investment would be taken care of for him,"
and "handled by the 'company'";
(2) "informed him of the average daily rental";
(3) "presented the rental agreements to him for his signature"; and
(4) placed "emphasis on the economic benefits to Hocking to be derived
from the managerial efforts of third parties designated or arranged for
by Dubois. ... "70
According to the six judges that formed the majority, the four facts alleged
satisfy the "presented as parts of one transaction" standard. The six judges
further assert, without explanation, that those allegations "distinguish this
case from the everyday situation in which a real estate agent or broker
merely provides information to the purchaser regarding the availability of a
70 Id. The plaintiff also alleged that he would not have purchased the
condominium except for the availability of the RPA, and that he in fact entered into
the pooling agreement after the purchase. Those allegations, however, do not relate to
the issue of whether the broker "presented" the RPA "as part of the same
transaction."
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rental pool or shared amenities such as a swimming pool or tennis
courts."
7 1
The real estate brokerage industry and condominium unit owners are
thus relegated to pondering the demarcation between "presenting" an RPA
"as part of a single transaction" and "merely providing information"
regarding availability of an RPA. On that gossamer distinction 72 hinges
substantial liability.
The four specific types of conduct alleged involve varying degrees of
risk. Assuring the purchaser that rental will be taken care of for him (the
first allegation) is not by itself likely to lead to characterization of the
transaction as a security, though some uncertainty exists. Because the core
function of any rental management arrangement is to take care of rentals
for the owner, stating that fact ought to fall within the allowable "merely
providing information" domain.
Informing the purchaser of the average daily rental (the second
allegation) entails greater peril because it bears on the "expectation of
profits" element of the Howey test. A broker might argue that the
prevailing rental rates are basic, vital information, when discussing a
property that is routinely rented, and should be permitted under the
"merely providing information" standard, but may not succeed. Disclosing
the daily rental may encourage the prospective purchaser to consider the
rental agreement and the real estate as a single transaction. (The Ninth
Circuit majority apparently accepted this proposition even though the
broker made no representation regarding the number of days per month
that rental could be expected, thus leaving to the prospective purchaser any
projection of total monthly income.)
Presenting the rental pooling agreement for signature (the third
allegation) appears to be the strongest support for the majority's
conclusion, although they accorded it no special attention. Although
obtaining the forms may have been simple, supplying them as part of the
sales pitch for the condominium unit indicates that the RPA was "presented
as part of the same transaction." (The dissenting justices assert that this
conduct was "unexceptional and surely too inconsequential," but fail to
explain or support their view.)73
Finally, placing emphasis on economic benefits from third parties (the
last allegation) almost certainly also exceeds the bounds. That emphasis in
the context of marketing the real estate suggests that the RPA is part of the
overall condominium transaction, thereby triggering the application of
securities law.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1466 (Norris, ., dissenting).
73 Id.
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In sum, the message that Hocking v. Dubois provides for condominium
unit owners and their real estate brokers is this: mentioning that a rental
pool is available from a third party is probably permissible, but describing
any aspect of it is dangerous, and drawing attention to its benefits or
obtaining the RPA forms for a prospective purchaser invites federal
securities law litigation.
3. Practical Implications: Hocking vs. Economic Realities
The restrictions and limitations that condominium unit owners and their
brokers would have to follow to satisfy the Hocking v. Dubois standards
are drastically divergent from conventional marketing practices. Real estate
owners and brokers consistently and routinely draw attention to every
attractive feature of the property they are marketing, provide all
information and documents that are likely to facilitate a sale, and
emphasize economic benefits. If the services of an unrelated third party are
available and would enhance the attractiveness or value of the real estate,
the owner or broker would of course include that fact in the marketing
effort. Prior to Hocking v. Dubois, there was no basis for concern that
referring to the availability of services from an outside party would convert
a real estate transaction into a securities transaction, triggering a plethora
of restrictions and liabilities.
The Hocking decision, stated in its extreme, is that a condominium
unit-which in isolation is merely real estate-becomes a security merely
because the seller or seller's broker describes to a prospective buyer rental
services available from an unrelated third party, with whom the unit owner
and the owner's broker have no connection and over whom they have no
control. If that position were taken to its logical extension, any sale of real
estate would become subject to the securities law if the seller draws
attention to a third party who is willing to manage it-surely a surprising
and extreme position.
IM. ONCE A SECURITY, ALWAYS A SECURITY?
Can a condominium unit be correctly characterized as a security when
initially offered and sold by the developer, and yet not be a security when
resold by its first purchaser on the secondary market? The most apparent
answer is that once an investment becomes a security it retains that
character in all subsequent transactions. This position, which has been
termed "once a security, always a security," 74 has an initial visceral
74 One commentator accurately described the position of the three-judge panel,
Hocking v. Dubois, 839 F.2d 560, 568-70 (9th Cir. 1988), as "once a security always
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appeal, and includes some elements which individually are correct, but
does not withstand analysis. The more defensible view is that each
transaction must be examined individually, creating the possibility that a
single condominium unit may be a security in some circumstances but not
in others.
A. The Error of Focusing on Preceding Transactions
In approaching the issue of whether a condominium transaction is a
security, one understandable tendency is to begin by examining the
marketing efforts of the developer. That approach conforms well to the
precedent on the issue, which has involved developers in almost all
instances. When the transaction at issue is a resale in the secondary market,
however, focusing on the developer is inappropriate and potentially
seriously misleading.
The Hocking facts are useful to illustrate the issue, though the same
issue could arise in many other contexts. Originally, the condominium
developer offered the units with an optional RPA, unquestionably
satisfying all elements of the Howey test. The developer would have been
subject to securities law liability even in favor of purchasers who elected to
buy a unit but not to participate in the RPA. 75 The following year, one of
the nonparticipating unit owners proceeded to offer and sell the unit on the
secondary market. One of the arguments of the purchaser was that because
the developer's transaction involved a security, the resale necessarily also
involved a security. 76
The three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit, whose opinion was
subsequently withdrawn by the Circuit en banc, found the argument to be
persuasive. The court found "absurd" the possibility that a "unit could
alternate between being a security and not being one as each successive
purchaser made his individual decision whether to participate in the
RPA. " 7 7
That statement reveals basic errors in analysis, deriving from its
misdirected focus on whether a "unit" in a condominium is a security. A
a security," though that particular phrase is not found in the Ninth Circuit opinion.
Hawaii Real Estate Reacts to Hocking vs. Dubois, 7 CONDOMINIUM HOTEL REP.No.
3, 2 (Peter M. Gunnar, ed., Fall 1988).
75 In S.E.C. v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299-301 (1946), citrus land was
offered together with a managerial services contract. The Supreme Court ruled that
the combination of elements in the offer created an investment contract, causing
securities law to be applicable to all offerees, even those who purchased only the land
and not the services.
76 Id.
77 Hocking, 839 F.2d at 570.
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condominium unit, or any other tangible property (such as a horse, beaver,
or earthworm), is never a security when considered in isolation. The
property may become an investment contract, and a security, when offered
in conjunction with a service contract or other arrangement for producing
"profits from the efforts of others."
Once it is recognized that the investment contract is not the tangible
item but rather the combination of the item with a service contract, the
purported absurdity evaporates. Whenever the combination is absent from
an offer, there is no investment contract and thus no basis for applying
securities law. 78 If the law were that every tangible item which once was
coupled with a profit-making arrangement is immutably a security even
when it is not coupled with a profit-making arrangement, then securities
regulation would be implausibly boundless in its reach. As an analogy,
similar reasoning would lead to application of motor vehicle registration
laws to a dismantled and scrapped fender merely because it once was part
of a vehicle.
The statement "once a security, always a security" could be correct in
situations in which a security is an indivisible item such as a bank
certificate of deposit, 79 but is not correct when a security is defined as
78 See, e.g., Rosenbaum, supra note 47, at 801-02. Rosenbaum criticized the
position that an initial offering that was deemed a security only because it was offered
with "emphasis" on economic benefits from the rental program would necessarily
remain a security on resale. He said: "[I]t seems that no security would be involved if
the owner were to employ a real estate broker to resell the unit without such
emphasis." Id.
79 The holding by the Supreme Court that a bank certificate of deposit ("C.D.")
was not a security when sold by the bank, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551
(1982), was followed by a district court case on whether a C.D. was a security in
relation to an auditor who prepared incorrect disclosures of the finances of the bank,
which later failed. Brockton Saving Bank v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 577 F.
Supp. 1281, 1286 (D. Mass. 1983). The district court concluded that the C.D. "must
be found to be a security before recovery under the securities laws can be sought for
the alleged fraud of accountants, bankers or anyone else involved with the
instrument[,]" and that the Supreme Court precedent established that a C.D. was never
a security. Using memorable imagery, the court stated that the plaintiff "'may be able
to allege that it purchased a car with no motor and that the seller was a crook, but it
cannot show that the car it purchased was "in effect" a bicycle.'" Id. at 1286-87,
quoted and discussed in M. Thomas Arnold, "When is a Car a Bicycle?" And Other
Riddles: The Definition of a Security Under the Federal Securities Laws, 33 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 449, 474-77 (1984-85). (I.e., the plaintiff may allege that the bank C.D. was
inordinantly risky but not that it was a security.) That language is colorful and
appealing, but inapposite to the Hocking situation. The defendant in Hocking would
not argue that property it offered (a condominium unit in isolation) had changed its
basic identity, but rather than it was no longer complete enough to constitute the
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being a combination of items. In that instance an investment becomes a
security as soon as the combination is offered, and loses that status
whenever the combination is absent.
B. The "Janus-Faced" Transaction: illustrations from the
Partnership Context
Comparable principles are evident in judicial treatment of partnerships
which, like condominiums, are not specifically listed in the statutory
definition of security, and thus are securities only if they meet the Howey
test.80 General partnerships usually are not securities because each partner
has the right to manage, and so does not expect profits from the managerial
efforts of others.81 Conversely, limited partnership interests typically are
securities because limited partners normally cannot exercise managerial
powers.82
Significantly, however, these characterizations are not immutable.
General partnership interests can become securities if the partnership
agreement denies key managerial powers to partners83 or the interests are
sold to persons who lack the business experience or expertise to exercise
management rights. 84 Limited partnership interests can lose their status as
securities if the limited partners in fact exercise managerial powers. 85
combination of items required by the definition. Applying the Brockton court's
imagery, the condominium unit had once been a bicycle (an investment contract
security, when it was offered with a profit-making arrangement), but now was merely
a bicycle part, being offered with no representation that it was anything more than
that. Even that analogy is unsatisfying, however, because a condominium unit is useful
and valuable whether or not it is connected to rental services, while a bicycle part is
useful only when connected to other parts.
80 Arnold, supra note 79, at 481.
81 See, e.g., a list of three criteria, any of which will cause general partnership
interests to be classified as securities in Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
82 Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 406-07 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 939 (1979) (limited partnership interest was a security because of restrictions on
limited partners' powers); Hirsch v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1227 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), aft'd, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977); Arnold, supra note 79, at 482.
83 A respected authority on securities stated that "[i]ndeed, even interests in
something called a general partnership may be securities when the venture, though a
general partnership de jure, functions de facto like a limited partnership." LOUIs
LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SEcuRrriEs REGULATION 191 (1983).
84 A leading case in this area explained the rule as follows:
If, for example, the partner has irrevocably delegated his powers, or is incapable
of exercising them, or is so dependent on the particular expertise of the promoter
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One decision involving partnership interests is particularly apposite,
demonstrating how a particular investment interest can change from a
security to a non-security. In Siebel v. ScoU, 8 6 the general partner in a
cable television limited partnership allegedly persuaded all of the limited
partners to sell back their interests at a low price, and then resold the
interests to new limited partners at over five times the price, keeping the
profit himself. The original limited partner sued, asserting securities fraud.
The general partner argued that in his hands the limited partnership
interests were not securities, because he was not dependent on the
managerial efforts of any other party.8 7
The Ninth Circuit, however, found that the Howey test had been
satisfied. The court focused on the fact that the original limited partners,
up until the moment they sold, were dependent on the managerial efforts of
the general partner for profits. The court stated that "it is not necessary
that an interest be deemed a security in the hands of both the seller and the
purchaser," and continued:
The characterization of an interest as a security or not can vary with the
relationship of its holder to the venture .... Otherwise stated,
transactions involving the sale of an interest which is a security because it
is an investment contract can be Janus-faced-simultaneously looking
forward and away from status as a security.88
or manager that he has no reasonable alternative to reliance on that person, then
his partnership powers may be inadequate to protect him from the dependence on
others which is implicit in an investment contract.
Williamson, 645 F.2d at 422-23; accord, Koch v. Hankins, 928 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir.
1991) (reaffirming that all Williamson v. Tucker factors continue to apply in the Ninth
Circuit after the Hocking v. Dubois decision); Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v.
Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 241 (4th Cir. 1988) (accepting the
Williamson v. Tucker position but with the proviso that each partner's business
expertise need not be evaluated separately); Deutsch Energy Co. v. Mazur, 813 F.2d
1567, 1570 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Williamson with approval); Less v. Lurie, 789
F.2d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1986); Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 1983);
Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 741 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203
(1983). Koppel v. Wien, 575 F. Supp. 960, 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). In comparison,
limited partnership interests typically are securities, because all managerial efforts are
provided by the general partner. See, e.g., Pawgan v. Silverstein, 265 F. Supp. 898,
900 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
85 Rodeo v. Gillman, 787 F.2d 1175, 1178-79 (7th Cir. 1986).
86 725 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1984).
87 Id. at 999.
88 Id.
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Comparable analysis applies to the condominium context. A person who
receives an offer of a unit with an RPA is entitled to the protection of
securities law. If that same individual buys the unit and later offers and
sells it without the RPA, however, securities law will not apply. The
determining factor in each instance is the content of the offer.
The question of whether the unit purchaser chose to participate in the
RPA is not determinative, or even particularly relevant-a point
misunderstood by the three-judge panel in the Hocking case. In the
Hocking situation, the Libermans (who bought from the developer) did not
participate in the RPA, but the plaintiff (who bought from the Libermans)
did participate. The opposite scenario, in which the first buyer participates
but the subsequent buyer does not participate, is equally likely to occur.
In both of those situations, and all variations of them, the appropriate
analysis is the same: determine whether the offer contains the essential
combination of condominium unit and rental pooling. The question of
whether the offeror or the offeree elected to participate in the pool does not
properly enter the analysis unless that evidence, in the factual context
presented, is probative of what the offer contained.
C. Identity and Characteristics of the Parties
Significant differences between developers of condominium complexes
and secondary sellers of condominium units provide yet another reason to
carefully separate analysis of whether the initial sale was a security from
the different issue of whether the resale was a security. The identity and
characteristics of both the seller and the buyer deserve consideration in
determining whether a particular transaction should be subject to securities
law.
Case law applying the Howey test has always considered the type of
offeree to which the offer was directed. In the Howey case itself, the fact
that the strips of citrus grove were sold to persons who lived far away and
had no interest or experience in cultivating the trees was important to
finding a security. If the purchasers had been fruit processing companies,
the result would very likely be different. Similarly, if an oil and gas
interest is sold to a dentist, it is far more likely to be classified as a
security that if it sold to Exxon.8 9 In the Hocking case, the facts that the
89 Allott, supra note 7, at 21-29, 21-30. Similarly, an interest in a thoroughbred
horse syndicate is far more likely to be deemed a security if sold to persons having
little or no experience in the horse industry than if sold to experienced horsemen.
Cooper, supra note 7, at 326. Similarly, an interest in general partnerships producing
jojoba beans is likely to be a security when sold to doctors and dentists. Koch, 928
F.2d 1471. Likewise, a fractionalized undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
rights is a security when sold by the promoter, but not a security when sold by the
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purchaser of the Hawaii real estate resided in Arizona, and was
pragmatically unable to derive the full economic benefits of ownership
unless he participated in the rental pool, were correctly considered and
provided support for the finding of a security.
The seller's characteristics are equally important. Courts have held, for
example, that a person who separates oil and gas or other mineral rights
into fractional undivided interests, and then sells them to individual
investors, is selling securities. 90 Yet when one of those investors resells a
single one of those interests-all that the investor owns-it is no longer a
security.91
In the condominium context, this line of precedent normally will tend
towards a finding that a secondary sale does not involve a security. A
developer who converts a building into the condominium form of
ownership, and sells individual units, is highly likely to be subjected to
securities laws, assuming that the developer simultaneously offers or
arranges for an RPA. An individual who buys a single unit, however, is in
a different situation. When that individual sells the single unit-all that the
investor owns-a court should be less prone to impose securities law
liability (although of course other factors may override this one).
D. Distinguishing Investment Contracts from Other Forms of Security
Important precedent supports the "once a security, always a security"
position. That precedent, however, is explicitly limited to stock and forms
of security that have a similarly well-defined meaning, and do not extend to
investment contracts, which must be analyzed separately. Those decisions,
owner of a single such interest. Allott, supra note 7, at 21-30 (citing SEC Releases
and case law); see also Continental Mktg. Corp. v. S.E.C., 387 F.2d 466, 468-69
(10th Cir. 1967) (beavers were investment contracts when coupled with specialized
breeding, boarding, and related services and sold to investors unable to care for the
animals themselves); Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435, 438-39 n.4 (5th Cir. 1961)
(oil leases were investment contracts when coupled with promise to drill test wells
nearby and sold to small investors incapable of drilling themselves).
90 One of the list of items in the statutory definition of the term "security" is
"fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights.. . ." Securities Act
of 1933, § 2(1); 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1); see also Oil & Gas Royalty Interests, Release
No. 33-185, Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 1031 (June 20, 1934); Harold S.
Bloomenthal, SEC Aspects of Oil and Gas Financing, 7 WYo. L.. 49, 53 (1953).
91 Woordward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 112 (10th Cir. 1959). The rationale has
been explained as follows: "It is the fractionalization for sale that creates the security.
Therefore, the courts have held that the transfer of all the seller owns, even though the
seller owns only an undivided fractional interest[, is not the sale of an undivided
fractional interest" (for purposes of the statutory definition of security). Allott, supra
note 7, at 21-30.
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therefore, do not apply to condominium resales. Condominium transactions
involve securities, if at all, because the combination of elements in the
offer constitutes an investment contract.
The greatest body of case law on whether an investment interest could
be a security in one party's hands but not in another party's hands involved
the sale of a business through transfer of its stock. A widely-accepted
position-subsequently overruled by the Supreme Court-held that stock
was a security in ordinary transactions in small blocks, but not when used
merely as a device to convey an entire business to a new owner. 92 The
reasoning, known as the "sale of business doctrine," was that a purchaser
of an entire business was realistically buying assets, not an interest in a
"common enterprise," and was expecting profits from the purchaser's own
efforts, not the efforts of others. 93
92 See, e.g., Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 200 (7th Cir. 1982); King v.
Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 346 (11th Cir. 1982); Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d
459, 464 (7th Cir. 1981); Chandler v. Kew, Inc., 691 F.2d 443, 444 (10th Cir. 1977).
Other circuits rejected the sale of business doctrine. Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496,
499 (5th Cir. 1983); Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc., 696 F.2d 227, 230 (2d
Cir. 1982); Coffin v. Polishing Machines, Inc., 596 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979). One of the primary objections to the doctrine was its
potential for creating different results relating to the same investment document. One
critic, for example, stated that "[i]nstruments purchased by multiple investors might be
securities as to some purchasers and non-securities as to others, or securities as to
sellers but not as to purchasers. Instruments might be securities if traded in a series of
small transactions but non-securities if the same transaction is effectuated in a single
sale." Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320, 325-26 (3d Cir. 1984), upheld sub.
nor., Gould v. Reufenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985). Another commentator said that
"is]hares of stock, unlike lizards, are not chameleons. Just as a leopard cannot change
its spots, an instrument cannot change its status as a security depending on who holds
it." Keith B. Darrell, Redefining a "Security': Is the Sale of a Business Through a
Stock Transfer Subject to the Federal Securities Laws?, 12 SEC. REG. L.. 22, 52
(1984).
93 According to one judicial survey, the sale of business doctrine had been
accepted by the Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, and rejected by the Second,
Third, Fourth, Fifth and Eighth. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348,
1351-52 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985) (adding the Ninth Circuit to
those adopting the doctrine). Among the commentators explaining and defending the
doctrine were Irving P. Seldin, When Stock Is Not a Security: The "Sale of Business"
Doctrine Under the Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 637 (1982); Larry E.
Ribstein, Securities Regulation, 34 MERCER L. REV. 1461, 1484 (1983) (stating that it
is "difficult to understand" why securities laws should apply "whether a transfer of all
of the assets of a business is structured as a sale of 'assets' or of 'stock'"); Robert B.
Thompson, The Shrinking Definition of a Security: Why Purchasing All of a
Company's Stock Is Not a Federal Security Transaction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 225
(1982). Among the representatives of the opposing view were Dennis S. Karjala,
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In 1985 the Supreme Court, in Landreth Tnber Co. v. Landreth,94
decisively rejected the "sale of business" doctrine, but did so in a manner
explicitly and strictly limited to interpretation of the term "stock."
Clarifying an ambiguity from its earlier decisions, 95 the Court stated that if
an interest labelled stock-one of the terms listed in the statutory definition
of security-had the usual characteristics of stock, it was a security
regardless of the transactional context. 96 On the surface, this conclusion
may appear to support the "once a security, always a security" view.97
Realigning Federal and State Roles in Securities Regulation Through the Definition of
a Security, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 413, 429 (stating that "courts upholding the sale of
business doctrine have introduced a disconcerting asymmetry into securities
transactions in that one party to a transaction may be dealing in a security while the
other is not"); Thomas Lee Hazen, Taking Stock of Stock and the Sale of Closely Held
Corporations: When Is Stock Not a Security?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 393 (1983); Barbara
Black, Is Stock a Security? A Criticism of the Sale of Business Doctrine in Securities
Fraud Litigation, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 325 (1983).
94 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
95 Particularly ambiguous was United Housing Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837
(1975), in which the majority opinion (supported by five Justices) was followed by
dissenting opinions of three Justices. One highly plausible interpretation was that the
housing cooperative stock at issue was not a security because it did not satisfy the
Howey test and hence was neither stock nor an investment contract as the statute used
those terms. In this interpretation, the Howey test was applied in relation to all terms
listed in the statutory definition of security. The Respondents in Landreth Timber took
this position. Landreth Timber, 471 U.S. at 684. An equally likely interpretation was
that the Court used a two-step analysis, in which the Howey test was applicable only in
the second step. First, the interest was not stock as the statute used that term because it
lacked the usual characteristics of stock (proportional voting rights, dividends,
possibility of appreciation in value, etc.). In addition, the interest was not an
investment contract because it lacked some of the elements required by Howey (such
as expectation of profits). The Court in Landreth Timber conceded, in a rather marked
understatement, that its previous cases had not been "entirely clear" on the issue. Id.
at 688. For a statement of the opposing interpretations, prior to the Landreth Timber
decision, see Arnold, supra note 79, at 455 ("vigorous debate" existed over whether
the Howey test applies only to investment contracts or also to "less elusive types of
securities, such as corporate stock...").
96 Landreth Timber, 471 U.S. at 693-94 (involving sale of 100% of the stock of
a corporation). See also the companion case, decided the same day, which rejected the
sale of business doctrine in the context of a sale of 50% of the stock of a corporation.
Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701, 706 (1985).
97 One commentator interprets the Landreth Timber decision as suggesting that a
thing "must be a security as to all or as to none .. .," and casting doubt on earlier
lower court cases finding that a partnership may be a security or non-security
depending on the sellers and purchasers involved. M. Thomas Arnold, The Definition
of a Security Under the Federal Securities Law Revisited, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 249,
264-65 (1986). Professor Arnold's interpretation, however, ignores the Court's
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The Court, however, drew a distinction between the terms in the
statutory list that had a well-settled meaning, such as "stock" or a bank
"certificate of deposit," and terms that had a more variable character that
were used as catch-alls, such as "investment contract" or "instruments
commonly known as a 'security. ' "98 The Howey test applied only to
"unusual instruments not easily characterized as 'securities. ' " 99 The
decision explicitly disclaimed any holding regarding interests other than
stock, which was treated as having a special status as the "paradigm" of a
security, 1°° and so the decision has no direct application to condominium
securities.
Indeed, in an indirect manner, the mode of analysis in the Landreth
Timber case tends to support the position that a condominium that is a
security in one transaction does not necessarily retain that status
perpetually. The Supreme Court focused, quite logically and correctly, on
the characteristics of the interest at the time of the transaction that was at
issue. In the condominium resale context, the appropriate time to apply the
Howey test is the time of the resale, not the time of the initial sale.
E. Foregoing a Bright-line Test
A practical objection to the argument for transaction-by-transaction
analysis of condominium sales is the uncertainty that results. If the rule
were that condominiums originally offered by developers with RPA's were
at that point immutably stamped as a security, for all subsequent
transactions, that rule at least is simple to understand and apply. Such
explicit limitation of its decision to stock, disclaiming any holding regarding other
types of securities.
98 Landreth Timber, 471 U.S. at 689. The reference to a bank certificate of
deposit was directed at the Court's prior decision in Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455
U.S. 551 (1982). The result, as one commentator phrased it is that "we now know that
the Court will apply the Howey test to investment contracts and a literal or plain
meaning approach to corporate stock...," though we still do not know which
approach applies to other types of instruments which are listed in the statutory
definition of security. Arnold, Revisited, supra note 97, at 266.
99 The Howey test, the Court stated, "was designed to* determine whether a
particular instrument is an 'investment contract,' not whether it fits within any of the
examples listed in the statutory definition of 'security'." Landreth Timber, 471 U.S. at
691. In an early landmark case on the subject, the Court interpreted the purpose of the
terms "investment contract" and "any interest or instrument commonly known as a
'security'," located in the statutory definition of security, as refering to "[n]ovel,
uncommon, or irregular devices" which are effectively securities even though they do
not fit the more standardized forms listed in other parts of the definition. S.E.C. v.
C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
100 Landreth Timber, 471 U.S. at 693.
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"bright line" tests have definite appeal in terms of administrative and
judicial efficiency, and the certainty that they provide to economic
actors.1 0 1
The goal of judicial economy, however, is not promoted by making
ordinary condominium resales actionable under securities law. 102 And the
goal of certainty does not justify judicial interpretations that exceed the
scope intended by Congress.1 03 As the Supreme Court has made clear (both
before and after Landreth limber), Congress did not intend the securities
acts to provide a federal remedy for all types of fraud, and transaction-by-
transaction analysis is vital when interpreting the term "investment
contract." 104
101 One of the circuit courts opposed to the "sale of business doctrine," for
example, voiced the common concern that "[t]he dangers in creating uncertainty as to
the scope of the Acts and in generating slippery legal and factual issues... are
substantial." Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1146 (2d Cir. 1982). The court
conceded that treating stock as a security regardless of the transactional context could
result in "a certain overbreadth in application," id., but considered that result to be
acceptable. The Supreme Court in Landreth Timber similarly stated its concern that,
without a bright-line rule regarding stock, "coverage by the Acts would in most cases
be unknown and unknowable to the parties at the time the stock was sold," and the
federal courts' caseloads would be high. Landreth limber, 471 U.S. at 696; see also
Arnold, Revisited, supra note 97, at 258-60 (discussing "How Important is a Clear
and Predictable Definition?" in relation to the Landreth Timber decision).
102 An argument made by the Seventh Circuit in support of the sale of business
doctrine remains persuasive in relation to investment contracts, despite the Supreme
Court's decision in Landreth imber regarding stock. The circuit court stated that:
We agree that the costs of administering legal rules are a proper concern in
designing those rules. But rarely will a net savings in those costs be produced by
expanding liability, since even if the legal standard will be simpler and therefore
cheaper to apply in each case the number of potential cases in which it will be
applied will be greater.
Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 202 (7th Cir. 1982).
103 Landreth limber, 471 U.S. at 699-700 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In a
"sale of business doctrine" case prior to Landreth Timber, the Seventh Circuit
conceded that ignoring the transactional context might simplify judicial decision-
making, but even "if there were some net cost savings we doubt they could justify
expanding liability to reach substantive evils far outside the scope of the legislature's
concern." Groen, 687 F.2d at 202.
104 United Housing Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975) (stating that the
test of an investment contract is flexible, based primarily upon the substance of the
transaction). Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 557 (1982), decided after the
Landreth Timber case, is particularly significant. The Court ruled that a bank
certificate of deposit was not a security, but noted that "[ilt does not follow that a
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IV. "EFFORTS OF OTHERS"-THE IMPLICIT NECESSITY FOR A
NEXUS BETWEEN THE OFFEROR AND THIRD PARTIES
When the profit-generating managerial efforts that might transform a
tangible item into an investment contract are provided not by the offeror
but by some third party, a key issue is whether those efforts satisfy the
Howey test's "efforts of others" element. 10 5 Case law has rarely examined
the type of relationship, if any, necessary between the offeror and the party
providing the services. The courts have generally assumed, rather than
decided, that the conduct of different parties can be attributed to one
another only if the parties have some arrangement, relationship or
affiliation. On examination, that assumption is sound and logically based,
even though one court has ruled to the contrary.
A. The Nexus Issue in the Condominium Context
The key importance of the nexus issue to sales of condominium units in
the secondary market can be illustrated by the facts in the Hocking case.
The defendant real estate broker marketed a condominium unit, described
an RPA that operated in the complex, obtained the necessary forms from
the RPA manager, and submitted them to the prospect, who purchased the
unit and later enrolled in the RPA. It was undisputed that the broker had
no authority or power to bind the RPA manager, and there was no
allegation that the broker received compensation from the RPA manager.
The Ninth Circuit ruled that the unit and the RPA were
"presented... as part of the same transaction," 10 6 and constituted the
offer of an investment contract. The six judge majority deemed the lack of
affiliation between the broker and the RPA manager to be unimportant,
asserting in fact that the issue was "nearly irrelevant." 107 For purposes of
certificate of deposit or business agreement between transacting parties invariably falls
outside the definition of a 'security' .... Each transaction must be analyzed and
evaluated on the basis of the content of the instruments in question, the purposes
intended to be served, and the factual setting as a whole." Id. at 560 n.l1.
105 See supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
106 Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1458 n.7 (9th Cir. 1989).
107 Id. An indication of the majority's lack of regard for the issue is that they
relegated it to a footnote. The note further states that "any hypothetical arrangement"
such as [the broker] receiving a commission from the RPA manager might tend to
support the plaintiff's arguments that the broker "presented" the RPA to him, but
"would have no bearing on whether or not she presented the condominium and RPA
as part of the same transaction." Id. The majority's point was that if the broker
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securities law, the majority noted, the term "offer" can include elements
which the offeror is not capable of delivering.
Many of the principles relied upon by the majority are firmly based in
precedent, correct in the abstract, but misapplied. More importantly,
however, the majority ignored (or relegated to a footnote) critical facts that
should have reversed the outcome of the case. Further, the majority sought
to bolster its position with language from a precedent that did apply but
was misconstrued and presented out of context.
B. Precedent on Integrating Conduct of Different Parties To Form an
Investment Contract
Though many judicial decisions have integrated the offerings or efforts
of more than one party, to determine that the overall offer constituted the
offer of an investment contract, those cases almost invariably involved
parties that were related or affiliated to one another in some meaningful
manner. The very few judicial intimations that no nexus is necessary are
dicta or poorly reasoned, and should not be followed.
The two Supreme Court decisions providing the foundation for most
subsequent interpretation of the definition of a security, Joiner and Howey,
provide excellent illustrations. In Joiner, oil leases were found to be
investment contracts because they were marketed with oil drilling by a
party closely related to the promoter. The Court pointedly noting that
"drilling of this well was not an unconnected or uncontrolled
phenomenon." 108 Similarly, in Howey, the citrus grove land offered by the
W.J. Howey Company was marketed with agricultural management
services to be provided by Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc. Significantly,
the Court pointed out that the two corporations were "under direct
common control and management." 0 9
Numerous subsequent decisions have combined, for purposes of
applying the Howey test, the efforts of more than one company or person.
The common element in these decisions, however, is that the different
parties in each situation have a relationship or affiliation with one
another. 110 The efforts of an individual clearly should be combined with
presented the RPA several months after the condominium purchase was complete, the
majority's "package" standard would not be satisfied.
108 SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 348 (1943).
109 SEC v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 295 (1945).
110 Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of Am., 608 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1979)
(developer offered both a condominium campground and mandatory rental pool);
Hodges v. H&R Inv., 668 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (promoter offered both
condominium units and a collateral rental agreement guaranteeing minimum rental
income); Wooldridge Homes v. Bronze Tree, 558 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Colo. 1983)
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the efforts of a corporation owned or controlled by that individual. The
efforts of a corporation should be combined with the efforts of a second
corporation when the two have a contractual relationship or are so
intertwined at the shareholder or management levels as to support a
conclusion that they are acting for their joint interests. 11
The entirely legitimate, and necessary, purpose of integrating for
analysis the activities of related or affiliated parties is to prevent promoters
from escaping securities laws by adopting forms of organization for evasive
purposes. In many securities law contexts, persons acting "in concert" are
treated as a single person for the purpose of applying regulations and
standards. The concept is well established and is supported by the Supreme
Court's repeated admonitions, in Howey and in previous and subsequent
decisions, to focus on the substance rather than the form of transactions
when applying securities laws.
Yet none of this precedent or reasoning supports integration of efforts
of parties who have no relationship or affiliation -with one another
whatsoever. No decision before Hocking concluded that a person marketing
a tangible item of property is subject to securities law merely because she
also assisted the offeree in obtaining managerial services from an unrelated
third party.
The Hocking court's sole citation in support of its position on this
point was Blackwell v. Bentson1 12, a case (like Howey) involving an offer
of citrus groves and harvesting services, found to constitute an investment
contract. The Hocking majority chose to select one phrase from that
decision, a reference to the real estate and the services forming
"constituent parts of what is essentially one transaction," 113 and offer that
phrase as precedent for its own "presented as part of one transaction"
formula.1 14
The majority's use of that prior decision is mistaken and misleading,
because it entirely omits a vital factual predicate of the decision: the
company offering the services was owned and operated by the same people
that owned the company that offered the real estate. Thus Blackwell v.
Bentson in fact supports the view that services and property can be
(promoter offered unimproved resort property, promised to build condominiums, and
made arrangements with another company to provide management services).
III Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 347 U.S. 925
(1953) (offers by two companies owned and operated by the same parties treated as
one offer).
112 Id. (cited by the Hocking majority, 885 F.2d at 1458 n.7, and by the Hocking
dissent, 885 F.2d at 1466).
113 Id.
1 14 Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1458 n.7 (9th Cir. 1989).
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integrated as "essentially one transaction" only when there is common
ownership or other relationship or affiliation.
Apparently only two other judicial opinions assert that nexus is
unnecessary: 115 Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 116 and Roe v. United
States.117 Those decisions deserve attention, but are flawed. The
Continental Marketing case involved the sale of live beavers by one
company, which marketed them as a "royal road to riches" with "fabulous
possibilities," 118 but only if the purchaser also purchased extensive
breeding, boarding and managment services from one of several other
companies operating beaver "ranches." 119 The Tenth Circuit ruled that the
arrangement constituted an investment contract.
Some of the "ranches" named as defendants in that case were in
competition with the beaver seller, whose own involvement was limited to
the sale of the animal. That fact might be seized upon as support for the
proposition that activities of unrelated businesses can be merged to find an
investment contract. 120 That approach, however, ignores critical additional
facts. The Tenth Circuit described in some detail the overall program of a
single promoter to establish a market for domestic beaver fur at prices
many hundreds of times higher than the previous market, through various
business entities. 121 The selling and servicing components of the scheme
were divided among different companies only in response to investigatory
and enforcement action by blue-sky administrators, and even then the new
companies "involve principally the same people who were involved in the
earlier organization." 122 The ranch services were provided by someone
whom the promoter "had induced to take up ranching" and operated under
his "expert supervision." 123 Though the Tenth Circuit stated that "[w]e do
not think the element of ownership or control is essential," 124 the factual
circumstances plainly entailed extensive long-term relationships among the
115 Peter A. MacLaren, Note, Profits in Paradise: When Resort Condominiums
Qualify as Investment Contracts, 19 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 177, 200-01 (1989).
Further research by the author of this Article did not disclose any additional examples.
116 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967).
117 287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1961).
118 Continental Marketing Corp., 387 F.2d at 470, 468.
119 Id. at 468-69. Though a beaver purchaser theoretically could take possession
of the animals directly, doing so was impractical, heavily discouraged by the seller,
and in fact never occurred.12 0 MacLaren, supra note 115, at 200.
121 Continental Marketing Corp., 387 F.2d at 470 n. 1 (sales at between $2,000
and $6,000 per beaver, when in actuality prices as low as $20 were available).
122 Id. at 469.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 470.
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provider of the animals and the provider of the services. The case cannot
reasonably be accepted as supporting the proposition that services offered
by one party can be attributed to another party having no connection,
relationship, or affiliation whatsoever.
The other case superficially appearing to deny the need for nexus, Roe
v. United States, involved the sale of oil leases on small tracts of land,
using methods the Fifth Circuit described as "a high-pitched, hard-sell
extravagant solicitation campaign." 125 The promoter told prospective
investors that they could get rich quick not by operating the leases-which
was plainly impractical for them-but by dramatic increases in value once
successful test wells were drilled.12 6 The Fifth Circuit correctly found that
the "efforts of others" element was satisfied, but further stated that "it
mattered not whether the test wells were to be drilled by the sellers, or by
third persons either under, or independent of their control." 127 That
sentence appears to deny the need for nexus.
The very next paragraph, however, seriously undercuts the authority of
that assertion. The court notes that the sellers (both the corporation and its
president) fixed the location of the test wells, substantially contributed to
the drilling (directly and through another wholly-owned corporation), and
continually supervised the wells. 128 Hence any intimation that an offeror is
responsible for conduct of unrelated parties is, at best, dicta and at worst
misleading. This case fits squarely within the principle that the efforts to be
analyzed are those, in Supreme Court's phraseology, of "the promoters or
third parties." 129
C. Practical Implications
If the views of the Hocking majority are accepted and given broad
application, the implications are extensive. A broad range of offers of
tangible property could result in application of securities law if the offeror
includes in the marketing effort any injudicious references to an
unaffiliated, unrelated third party who would be willing if asked to provide
some managerial service in relation to the item.
To illustrate, suppose that an enterprising real estate management
company in a resort community approached the individual owners of
cottages and other single-family residences, offering a rental service. In
exchange for a percentage of the rents generated, the management company
125 Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435, 436 (5th Cir. 1961).
126 Id. at 438, 439 n.4.
127 Id. at 439 n.5 (citations omitted).
128 Id. at 439-40.
129 United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 854 (1975).
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would advertise all the facilities to tourists from metropolitan areas, and
handle reservations, on behalf of any property owner whose residence was
vacant at the time and who chose to participate. One of the cottage owners,
who did not participate, later advertises her cottage for sale, listing as one
of its attractions the fact that a purchaser might earn rental income by
contracting with the management company. The purchaser later alleges
some misstatement or omission-perhaps nondisclosure of a leak in the
roof.
Are those facts, without more, enough to state a securities fraud
action? The Ninth Circuit standard would hold that it was, at least to the
extent of surviving a motion to dismiss. Because both the real estate and
the services were presented as a "package," the seller and any real estate
broker that was involved could be found to have offered an investment
contract. The facts that the seller and broker had no relationship,
connection or affiliation with the management company, and never used the
management company's services, would be deemed irrelevant.
In the condominium context, any owner of an individual unit who
contemplates sale must be extremely circumspect if any third party stands
ready to provide rental services for such units. Mere mention of that third
party to a prospective purchaser might be permissible, but any further
discussion raises the danger that the seller and any broker involved will be
subjected to a quagmire of federal securities law litigation and liability.
Moreover, nothing in the standards enunciated in Hocking limit their
application to real estate. Anyone marketing any type of real or personal
property (as principal or agent) might be blindsided by a securities law
complaint if the sales pitch included discussion of managerial services
available from an unaffiliated third party.
The logical means to avoid this unwarranted and unprecedented
extension of securities law is to recognize the necessity for a nexus
between the offeror and the provider of any services sought to be
integrated into the offer. Just as in the Howey case and every previous
decision on investment contracts, tangible property and services should be
deemed part of a single offer only if the parties offering are connected
through common ownership, contractual relationship, or agreement. When
that nexus is missing, the only defensible application of securities law
might be to the RPA, considered separately from the condominium unit.
D. Preventing Use of an Intermediary as a Subterfuge
One valid, but surmountable, objection to excluding downstream or
secondary sales of condominiums from the registration requirements is the
potential for opening an avenue for evasion of registration by developers.
Developers who directly offer to the public condominium units with
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associated rental services are unquestionably subject to registration
requirements. If resales are not subject to registration, some developers
might be tempted to structure a sale ultimately to the public through an
intermediary.
A two-step scheme is possible. First, the developer would sell to a
person or entity who is not formally connected to either the developer or
the rental manager, but is nevertheless cooperative-perhaps a friend or
business associate. A number of exemptions available to issuers (such as
those for private placements, accredited investors, or intrastate offerings)
might be asserted to avoid registering that transaction. Then, the
intermediary would resell to the ultimate owners-members of the public
intending to use the condominium as a residence and a long-term
investment. The exemption for "transactions [not involving] an issuer,
underwriter, or dealer"130 might be asserted. The overall result would be
sale by the developer ultimately to the public without registration,
circumventing the Securities Act's requirements and goals.
That concern is valid and reasonable, but adequately addressed by
existing securities law principles developed for just such situations. The
SEC's Rule 144 deals specifically with resales, for the purpose of
preventing use of intermediaries to evade registration. 131 The rule defines
the statutory "underwriter" and an additional term "control person" (a
"person] controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the
issuer"), and imposes restrictions on resale with registration. Application
of those existing standards would separate the ordinary condominium unit
resale, which should not be subject to registration requirements, from the
contrived resale by a developer through an intermediary.
V. COURTS VS. THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Normally, the position of a federal regulatory agency on a
controversial issue is a prime concern of a party engaged in a transaction
within the agency's area of authority, and also is accorded substantial
deference by courts. Thus it would be natural to expect that the Securities
and Exchange Commission would play an important role in the application
of securities law to condominiums units sold in the secondary market with
rental arrangements. In fact, those assumptions are not correct; the SEC is
not oriented toward stringent regulation in this field, and the Commission's
views are as likely to receive derision as deference in the courts.
130 Securities Act § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1988).
131 Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1989).
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A. SEC's Guidelines on Condominiums as Securities
The most comprehensive single statement of the Security and Exchange
Commission's policy regarding condominiums as securities is its Release
No. 33-5347132 (hereinafter "Release"), issued in 1973. The Release noted
that securities law may apply to certain types of real estate development,
and set out a list of key criteria.
The SEC correctly focused on the content of the offer, rather than the
purchase, stating that a condominium unit can be treated as a security if it
is "offered in conjunction with" any of three specified factors. (That phrase
is not inconsistent with the "presented as part of the same transaction"
standard recently adopted by the Ninth Circuit in the Hocking case.) The
three factors are as follows:
(1) Emphasis on economic benefits to the purchaser to be derived from the
managerial efforts of the promoter, or a third party designated or
arranged for by the promoter, from rental of the units.
(2) The offering of participation in a rental pooling arrangement.
(3) The offering of a mandatory "rental or similar arrangement" by which
the owner is "materially restricted in his occupancy or rental of his
unit." 133
Those guidelines are subject to some criticism for vagueness and
overbreadth in some respects, but generally are consistent with principles
drawn from judicial precedent. 134 Developers in the initial offerings market
132 Guidelines as to the Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to Offers and
Sales of Condominiums or Units in a Real Estate Development, S.E.C. Securities Act
Release No. 33-5347 (Jan. 4, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 9587, 1 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
1049, [hereinafter Securities Act Release No. 33-5347]. The Release is discussed in
Brannen, supra note 58.
133 Securities Act Release No. 33-5347, supra note 132.
134 The first factor, marketing emphasis, was explicitly based on the Joiner
decision, in which the Supreme Court stated that "it is not inappropriate that
promoters' offerings be judged as being what they were represented to be." SEC v.
C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 353 (1943). Though the Joiner decision
antedated Howey, it was not overruled and is not inconsistent. Indeed the phrase in the
Howey formula that an investor is "led to expect profits..." appears to suggest that a
focus on the sales effort is valid. The Howey decision itself analyzed the promoter's
marketing techniques, and subsequent judicial decisions have followed suit. See, e.g.,
Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, 627 F.2d 1036, 1039 (10th Cir. 1980) ("Central to
the test is the promotional emphasis of the developer."). The second factor on the SEC
Release's list, an RPA, is consistent with the Howey "economic realities" test, in that
an RPA raises an expectation of profits from the efforts of others, plus horizontal
commonality because rental income is shared among all participating unit owners. The
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have found ways to structure economically viable condominium complexes
and marketing programs to avoid the application of securities law under the
Release's standards.1 35
final factor, mandatory rental or material restrictions on use, is more questionable.
Though restrictions are relevant, tending to show that investors are led to expect
profits from the efforts of others, it is not clear that the "commonality" element of the
Howey test is satisfied. The factor would be satisfied even by non-pooled rental
arrangements lacking horizontal and even strict vertical commonality, resulting in
merely a fee-for-services arrangement with no emphasis in the marketing on profit-
making potential. Under established case law, courts would not normally find a
security under those circumstances. The imprecision of the SEC in this respect is
perhaps not surprising, because the Release was issued in 1973 before extensive case
law development of the commonality principle. This is one area that deserves renewed
attention from the SEC.
135 One safe, and apparently typical, course is to carefully avoid any pooling
aspect in rental arrangements that developers offer or promote. See, e.g., Marco Polo
Hotel, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL 108553 (Sept. 30, 1987) (rental services
offered by the developer will not involve pooling); Choice Hotel Group of N.Y., Inc.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL 108438 (Sept. 2, 1987) (rental program without
pooling offered by the developer); QMR Coop, SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL
107880 (March 25, 1987) (rental program without pooling offered by a cooperative
organized after sale of all units); Pacific Lighting Properties, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1985 WIL 54519 (Oct. 16, 1985) (leaseback arrangement without pooling
offered by the developer). Many developers go to the extent of expressly prohibiting
pooling even if offered by third parties such as the condominium owners association
and independent real estate management firms. See, e.g., Congdon's Resort Corp.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 67156 (June 30, 1986) (no pooling allowed while
developer is in control of the condominium owners association); Point East Associates,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 669041 (May 15, 1986) (no pooling allowed);
Sunrise Terrace Trust, SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 65174 (Jan. 8, 1986) (no
pooling contemplated; if pooling is ever adopted, it can only be by owners association
after sale of entire project, subject to possible retention of certain of the units by the
developer or its affiliates); Rank Dev., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WVL 54133
(April 5, 1985) (no pooling allowed).
Some other developers, however, have taken a more aggressive stance, using
"rotation," or "ladder rotation," in which the rental manager assigns each new
prospective paying guest to the condominium unit which has been rented for fewer
days than the other available units. See, e.g., Resort Holdings I, Ltd. and Resort
Holdings II, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 67101 (June 19, 1986) (unless
guests specify a particular unit, they "will be assigned to the Unit of the desired size
or type which has been rented and occupied by its owner the least number of days").
The result is to allocate overall rental income from the rental operation equally, or
nearly equally, among all participating unit owners-a consequence very similar to the
result of a rental pool. A description of the process is contained in Peter M. Gunnar,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL 108044 (May 7, 1987). Rotation may be permitted,
while pooling is not, because the income allocated to each owner participating in a
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In relation to the secondary market, however, little or no guidance can
be found in the Release. The Release's purpose, stated in its introduction,
was to "alert persons engaged in the business of building and selling
condominiums" to their responsibilities under securities law. 136 The
purchaser of an individual condominium unit who later seeks to sell that
one unit is not normally "in the business of building and selling
condominiums." All of the standards explicated in the Release apply
rotation rental arrangement derives only from that owner's unit, so that horizontal
commonality is lacking. Recreational Indus., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL
107952 (March 13, 1987). Whether rotation successfully avoids the SEC's strong
position on pooling, however, remains uncertain. See, e.g., Peter M. Gunnar, SEC
No-Action Letter, supra (noting that when five lawfirms were consulted, two agreed
and three disagreed that rotation violated the standards in Securities Act Release No.
33-5347, and asking for a definitive statement; the staff declined to provide such a
statement).
Another approach used by developers is to lease units from the owners for a flat
daily rate, and then rent them to tourists. Because lease payments are due whether or
not paying guests are found, the unit owners are not in a "common enterprise" with
the developer. See, e.g., Marco Polo Hotel, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, supra
(permitting a developer to offer both a non-pooled rental services program and a
leaseback program to prospective purchasers of condominium units, without securities
registration). The inquiry letter cited no-action positions taken in similar arrangements
in Indian River Plantation, 1977 WL 14542 (May 4, 1977) (leases for annual, winter,
or summer terms), and Real Property Ventures, 1983 WL 28538 (Aug. 11, 1983).
Expressly leaving investors with power to make important decisions may avoid a
finding of "expectation of profits" from managerial "efforts of others." See, e.g.,
Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 1976) (stating that an
investor who retains partial control over management, even if she does not exercise
that control, does not need the protection of securities laws); Perry v. Gammon, 583
F. Supp. 1230, 1233 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (stating that merely hiring a property manager
does not satisfy the Howey test, and "[tlo hold otherwise would convert into a
securities transaction almost any sort of real estate investment where the investors
delegate management of the properties"); see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d
404, 421 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981), citing Schultz v. Dain Corp.,
568 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1978). Accordingly, rental program contracts often allow
condominium unit owner participants to opt out at will, suggesting that the unit owner
retains managerial rights at all times, even when delegating those rights to the
developer. See, e.g., Recreational Indus., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, supra;
Planners Dev. Corp. of Am., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55678 (Nov. 8, 1985);
Investment Properties Int'l, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55492 (June 10,
1985). Rental programs also sometimes provide that the participating unit owner
retains the right to determine the rental rate, a primary managerial decision. See, e.g.,
Silverado Banking, SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 54134 (April 3, 1985); Richfield
Properties, SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 51990 (Dec. 18, 1984).
136 Securities Act Release No. 33-5347, supra note 132, at 82,536.
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logically to developers or promoters of condominium complexes, but not to
individual unit owners or their real estate agents.
For example, part one of the Release focuses on marketing emphasis on
benefits from the "managerial efforts of the promoter, or a third party
designated or arranged for by the promoter, from rental of the units." It is
entirely logical that rental services that the promoter mentions in the course
of marketing a condominium unit should be deemed part of the offer if the
promoter will provide both the real estate and the services. Extending that
rule to include services from a third party "designated or arranged for by
the promoter" is logical and necessary to foreclose a simple subterfuge for
avoiding the application of securities law.
Further extension of this approach to an offeror in the secondary
market, however, is not rational when the third party is not owned,
controlled, affiliated with, or arranged by the offeror. The Release's
reference to integration of the unit with third party services is justified in
its context discussing promoters' offers, but should not be indiscriminately
applied to inappropriate contexts. 137 When an individual purchases a single
unit (with or without the rental services) and subsequently offers to sell the
unit on the secondary market, nothing in the Release supports the position
that rental services should be deemed part of the seller's offer merely
because the seller honestly discloses their availability from a third party
having no nexus to the unit owner.
Removing any possible uncertainty, the Commission has specified
unequivocally, in a litigation context,1 38 that the Release "does not apply to
persons who resell their own individual units... and have no affiliation or
selling arrangement with the pool operator."139 Though the Release itself
did not expressly exclude secondary sales from its coverage, it was by its
own terms directed only to developers and promoters. The SEC's
137 Rosenbaum, supra note 47, at 793 n.32 ("The limitation to benefits to be
derived from the efforts of either the developer or someone designated or arranged for
by the developer is significant and is required by the case law."); see SEC v. W.I.
Howey, 328 U.S. 293 (1946). An offering of condominiums would presumably not
involve securities merely because promotional literature emphasized the rental income
purchasers might realize through the use of unaffiliated real estate agents.
138 According to a former Chairman of the SEC, "positions taken in all amicus
briefs are reviewed, before they are filed, by the entire Commission, and are
approved by the Commission. The positions.., are not simply the work of the
Commission's counsel-they are the Commission's views." David S. Ruder, The
Development of Legal Doctrine Through Amicus Participation: The SEC Experience,
1989 Wis. L. Rev. 1167, 1180.
139 Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae at 13-14
(quoting Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1464 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris,
dissenting)).
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interpretation of its own Release, therefore, is logical and consistent, and
deserves acceptance by the courts and commentators.
B. "No-Action" Interpretations from the SEC Staff
Moreover, advice issued by the SEC's staff in a number of instances
(but with one notable exception) supports the view that attribution of the
rental efforts of one party to an unaffiliated offeror is not warranted.
The advice has come in the form of "no-action letters," responses by
the staff of the SEC in response to written inquiries, stating that if
particular transactions occur as described in the inquiry the staff will not
recommend that the Commission take enforcement action against the
individuals involved.140 Though no-action letters are not binding on the
five-member governing Commission, 14 1 or on private litigants, 142 and
certainly not on the courts, 143 they are useful as examples of what the SEC
staff finds acceptable, form patterns that provide guidance, and, at the very
minimum, tend to protect those who rely on them from charges of wilful
misconduct. 144
140 Procedure Applicable to Requests for No Action or Interpretive Letters,
Securities Act Release No. 5127 (Jan. 25, 1971), 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
66,481.10. No-action letters have been publicly available since 1970. 17 C.F.R. §
200.81 (1988); Exchange Act Release No. 9006, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,921 at 80,051 (Oct. 29, 1970).
141 The letters reflect the views of the S.E.C. staff that prepares them, and "do
not constitute an official expression of the Commission's views .... " 17 C.F.R.
§202.1(d) (1987). They "are subject to reconsideration and should not be regarded as
precedents binding on the Commission." Exchange Act Release No. 9006, supra note
140, at 80,052.
142 Nonpublic Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6,
1962) 2770-2783, 27 Fed. Reg. 11316 (a private litigant may argue in court that
certain facts constitute a violation of securities laws despite a no-action opinion that
those facts do not constitute a violation).
143 Courts are not bound by views expressed by employees of an administrative
agency. Nevertheless, no-action letters "clearly influence judicial decisions," at least
at the District Court level. David A. Lipton, A Primer on Broker-Dealer Registration,
36 CATH. U.L. REV., 899, 941 (1987) (citing ADM Corp. v. Thomson, No. 82-1618,
slip op. (1st Cir. May 24, 1983)); Bauman v. Bish, 571 F. Supp. 1054 (N.D. W.Va.
1983). According to Kenneth Bialkin, former chair of the A.B.A. section on
Corporation, Business and Banking Law, "most courts, when presented with a no-
action letter, will agree with the letter's position." Lipton, supra at 940 n.213 (citing
K. Eppler, Rule 145 in Practice, 5 PLI Inst. Sec. Reg. 337 (1974)).
144 See, e.g., H. Kook & Co. v. Scheinman, Hochstin & Trotta, Inc., 414 F.2d
93, 98 (2d Cir. 1969) (broker's reliance on no-action letters was reasonable,
protecting broker from charges of violating an S.E.C. order); Colema Realty v.
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The single no-action letter that addressed the application of securities
law to secondary sales of condominiums responded to an inquiry in 1976
regarding a condominium named Embarcadero.1 45 The associated rental
pool agreement automatically terminated according to its own provisions
upon sale of unit, and the new owner could then apply for entrance into the
pool. When asked whether a local real estate agent could sell a unit on
behalf of an individual owner without being licensed as a securities broker-
dealer, the SEC staff (without explanation) declined to provide assurance
that it would not recommend enforcement action. 146 This 1976 staff letter
is inconsistent with more recent no-action letters, and has been specifically
rejected by the SEC, 147 yet continues to constitute a source of
embarrassment for the Commission.1 48 Interestingly, the Embarcadero
inquiry was submitted not by the real estate agent but by the developer,
suggesting the possibility of a relationship between them. 149
More recent no-action letters have not involved resales by individual
owners, 150 but a number of them deal with situations presenting allied
issues. The SEC staff has indicated, for example, that a developer's offer
of condominium units will not be integrated with rental services available
from an entity other than the developer and not controlled by the
Bibow, 555 F. Supp. 1030, 1037 (D. Conn. 1983) (position stated in a prior no-action
letter was more persuasive to the court than position taken by the Commission itself).
145 Embarcadero, SEC No-Action Letter [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 80,956, at 87,512 (Dec. 3, 1976).
146 Id. The entire "SEC staff reply" consists of only four short paragraphs stating
the issue and the conclusion, with no discussion whatsoever.
147 The SEC stated that the Embarcadero letter was not binding on the present
staff or the Commission. MacLaren, supra note 115, at 221 n.235 (citing Brief of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae at 14 n. 5, Hocking v. Dubois,
885 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1989)).
148 Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1456-57 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting SEC's
amicus position in part because it was "perhaps inconsistent" with the Embarcadero
letter).
149 Embarcadero, SEC No-Action letter, supra note 145 (Letter of Inquiry from
Yaquina Dev. Corp., which originally offered the condominium units and
subsequently operated the rental pool).
150 Only one No-Action Letter was located that even mentioned resale of
condominium units. Planners Dev. Corp. of Am., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note
135. Planners Development planned to purchase and then sell units that it had just
previously converted to condominiums itself, or which an independent third party had
converted. No particular attention was directed to the fact that sale of units converted
by some third party would constitute resales, and the situation seems distinct from the
more routine type of condominium unit resale, exemplified by the Hocking v. Dubois
case, in which the purchaser of a single unit sells that unit.
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developer.151 In one case, the rental pool was organized by the
condominium unit owner's association after the developer had released
control over it.152
In two similar situations, the staff granted no-action even though
establishment of a rental pool in one phase of a large condominium project
may have raised a presumption in the minds of potential purchasers of units
in subsequent phases that a rental pool would be eventually offered to
them. 153 No-action was also granted in yet another case in which the
developer advised potential purchasers that the independent condominium
owners' association might effect a future rental pool arrangement after the
developer sold all except certain of the units. 154
Two no-action letters that are particularly useful involved companies
named Rockresorts, Inc. 155 and Planners Development Corporation. 156 In
the Planners Development situation, in 1985, the developer proposed to
offer condominium units through conventional real estate processes, using
advertising, projections of income, and other means of solicitation that
would not be permissible if its offering involved a security, unless it were
registered. At the same time, the developer would arrange for the
condominium owners association to offer optional leasing services to unit
151 One developer, for example, noted that the homeowners association might
select a rental agent, and unit owners might decide to use that agent's services, but
that the developer will not make any such arrangements or designations and has no
affiliation with any management company. Richfield Properties, SEC No-Action
Letter, supra note 135. Another no-action request, going further, stated that "It is
probable that at some time during which the Developer is still in control of the
Development, a rental office will be established on the site of the Development to
provide rental services, on a non-pooled basis .... " and that the rental agent might
be the same broker who sold the units under an agreement with the developer. This
no-action request emphasized that pooling would be avoided and participation was
optional. Rank Dev., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 135.152 Recreational Indus., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 135.
153 Id. (rental pool operated by condominium association in a previous phase of
the project may have raised an expectation in minds of purchasers of a subsequent
phase that a rental pool would also be made available to them); Terrace Hills
Condominium, SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 28696 (July 27, 1983), cited and
discussed in ROBERT J. HAFr, ANALYsIs OF KEY SEC No-ACTON LETrERs, 1-10
and 1-11 (1985-86 ed.) (a completed project with a rental pool operated by
condominium association would be followed by "identical" project by the same
developer).
154 Sunrise Terrace Trust, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 135, cited and
described in Recreational Indus., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 135.
155 Rockresorts, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 55887 (Nov. 12, 1986).
156 Planners Dev. Corp. of Am., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 135.
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purchasers. The SEC staff granted a No-Action Letter, apparently because
the developer and the association were separate entities. 157
In the other case, in 1986, Rockresorts, Inc. proposed offering rental
services to owners of condominium units who had previously purchased
them from a developer, and to do so without filing a registration statement.
Rockresorts would contract with the developer, to control such matters as
advertising (to assure that availability of rental services -was not mentioned
as an inducement to buy the condominiums), but the two companies were
otherwise unaffiliated. The staff granted no-action (though admittedly its
failure to explain its position allows for alternate interpretations). 158
The Hocking facts present an even stronger basis for concluding that
the condominium seller and the rental services manager were distinct
parties whose activities should not be integrated. Unlike Planners
Development, the private individuals in Hocking who sold the one
condominium unit that they owned did not have the capacity to influence
157 The completely conclusory nature of the letter concededly does allow for
alternate explanations. For example, the developer also argued that the right of each
unit owner to select the association, some other agent, or no agent for rental services
established that unit owners would not be depending for profits on the managerial
efforts of others. Planners Dev. Corp. of Am., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 135.
Possibly that argument was persuasive to the SEC staff. There may possibly be
significance also in the fact that the no-action letter gave no response whatsoever to
the developer's request for advice that offer of the condominiums would not involve
the sale of securities. The SEC staff stated only that it would not recommend
enforcement action to the Commission-its standard formula in all no-action letters on
condominiums in recent years. One possible inference is that the staff feels that the
offering did involve a security, but that other types of transactions deserve priority for
the staff's limited enforcement resources.
158 Rockresorts' counsel, Peter M. Gunnar, requested no-action advice by a letter
dated August 23, 1985, and supplemented that request by a letter dated September 12,
1985 that began "You have asked us to comment.., on the 'vertical commonality'
concept .... " Rockresorts argued, first, that vertical commonality is not accepted by
most circuits or by the Supreme Court and, secondly, that even if the "common
enterprise" element was present, the "investment of money" element was absent,
because the unit owners would be merely contracting for services on property they
already owned. Although the unit owners had paid the developer money for their
units, no part of that investment was received by Rockresorts, and the two companies
operated independently. The SEC staff then issued a No-Action Letter which,
regrettably but characteristically, provided no clue as to which of the two arguments
(or both) it found persuasive. Rockresorts, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note
155. (If the no-action decision was based on the "investment of money" argument, it
supports the position that the offer of condominium units by one party and the offer of
rental services by another party do not combine to form an investment contract when
the two parties are not affiliated.)
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the operations of the rental services corporation. 159 Unlike Rockresorts, the
seller had no affiliation, relationship, or contractual arrangement with the
rental manager. 160 Accordingly, having adopted no-action positions in the
Planners Development and Rockresorts situations, the SEC staff could not
logically have denied similar treatment to the Hocking sellers, if they had
asked.
These administrative interpretations reinforce the logical inferences
suggested by the SEC's Release and the explicit interpretations publicly
expressed by the SEC. All of these sources (after the 1976 Embarcadero
staff letter) suggest that private parties have little cause for concern that the
SEC will rigidly enforce regulations in cases involving condominiums
coupled with rental arrangements. Even more clearly, the SEC is not
oriented to pursue individual condominium unit owners who market units
on the secondary market when the rental arrangements are offered by
unaffiliated third parties.
C. No Respect for the SEC in the Courts
The SEC's release and administrative interpretations govern its own
enforcement policies, but do not necessarily influence the courts. The
Commission's record of success in the courts, as direct party plaintiff in its
enforcement role, and as amicus curiae in actions brought by private
plaintiffs, has been decidedly mixed. During the 1970's, the Supreme
Court repeatedly rejected the SEC's positions, sometimes with harsh
criticism.161 More recently, the SEC's success rate has improved
159 Planners Development proposed "to purchase all or a significant portion of a
residential condominium project and to resell one or more Units to individual
purchasers for a profit." Planners Dev. Corp. of Am., SEC No-Action Letter, supra
note 135 (1985). The developer would write the project's condominium declaration,
presumably during the period in which the developer maintained ownership, to require
the association of unit owners to provide certain rental services in addition to the usual
functions of such an association, such as maintenance of the common elements. In
contrast, the defendant real estate agent in Hocking never owned any condominium
units and never had the economic power to control or influence the operations of the
rental services manager.
160 Rockresorts had a contract with the developer that allowed Rockresorts to
limit the types of solicitations used by the personnel selling the condo units, including
reviewing the advertising to ensure that it did not promote any expectation of profits
from the managerial efforts of Rockresorts. Rockresorts, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
supra note 155. The condominium seller in Hocking, in contrast, did not enroll in the
rental manager's program and had no contractual relationship at all with the rental
manager.
161 See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566
(1979) (SEC's argument, that employee's interest in a pension plan was a security,
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dramatically, 16 2 though the Supreme Court continues to criticize the agency
on occasion. 163
The small number of judicial decisions that refer directly to the Release
display a similar pattern of deference mixed with derision. The Supreme
Court in Forman noted that the SEC's amicus brief flatly contradicted its
position in the Release, and concluded that "we accord no special weight to
its views." 164 The Ninth Circuit majority in Hocking cited that Supreme
Court precedent, and an alleged inconsistency between the SEC's amicus
brief and a twenty-year-old advisory letter written by the SEC staff, as
justification for completely rejecting the SEC's position in the Hocking
case.
165
was not "even arguably within its outer limits of authority" and not entitled to
deference); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 117-19 (1978); Piper v. Chris Craft Indus.,
430 U.S. 1, 41 n.27 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-14
(1976); United Housing Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 n.25 (1975); Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 746-47 n.10 (1975); Reliance Elec. v.
Emerson Elec., 404 U.S. 418, 426 (1972). A former SEC Chairman acknowledges the
1970's as a "low period" for the Commission in its litigation record. Ruder, supra
note 138, at 1182.
162 The Supreme Court adopted the SEC's views in eight of the nine Supreme
Court cases in which the SEC filed amicus briefs between 1980 and 1989. Pinter v.
Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, at 651 n.27 (1988) ("seller" liability under the 1933 Act); Basic,
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) ("fraud on the market" theory);
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (arbitration
clauses); Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647 (1986) (damages); Bateman Eichler,
Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985) (in pari delicto defense); Gould v.
Rueferacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985) ("sale of business" doctrine); Landreth Timber Co.
v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985) ("sale of business" doctrine); Herman & MacLean
v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1973) (implied causes of action). The SEC position lost
in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (constitutionality of
state takeover law). A former SEC Chairman pronounces the agency's amicus
program "a very successful policy making tool" and indeed "brilliant." Ruder, supra
note 138, at 1168, 1180.
163 See, e.g., Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (both the majority and the
dissenting Justices criticized the SEC for arguing that a defendant was liable
derivatively as a "tippee," based on the primary breach of duty by a "tippor," yet did
not prosecute the tippor).
164 Forman, 421 U.S. at 859 n.25 (particularly interesting because the Release
had been issued by the SEC only two years previously, in 1973).
165 Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d. 1449, 1456-57. According to the Ninth Circuit
majority, the SEC's position that the Release applied only to developers having
affiliation with a rental pool operator was "not readily apparent from the language of
the release" and "perhaps inconsistent with the SEC Division of Corporate Finance's
refusal to take a no-action position in Embarcadero." Id. Accordingly, the court
declined to rely on the Release as a basis for its decision, and implicitly rejected the
rationale of the SEC's amicus brief. The dissenting judges argued that the SEC's
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In a few other instances, however, the lower federal courts have
accorded deference to the SEC's position regarding treatment of
condominium transactions under the securities laws. 166 Nevertheless,
conformity with the SEC position provides only limited comfort that a
court will agree.
VI. CONSEQUENCES ON THE CONDOMINIUM INDUSTRY: THE
IMPRACTICALITY OF COMPLIANCE
A determination that a condominium unit coupled with rental
management services as an investment contract triggers extensive legal and
pragmatic repercussions. The federal securities registration, exemption,
and liability provisions that apply entail such great complexity, expense,
and delay as to be daunting even to large and sophisticated condominium
developers. Extending the applicability of those provisions to individual
unit owners in the secondary sales market risks serious negative
consequences on the resort condominium industry.
A. Registration Requirements Applicable to Condominium Resales
Categorizing a condominium as an investment contract makes it subject
to the Securities Act of 1933 (hereinafter 1933 Act). The act applies to
"any person"-whether or not an issuer-and "any offer or sale," whether
in the primary or secondary markets. 167 Every security must be registered,
unless the transferor can sustain the burden of proof that a specific
exemption applies. 168
position in Hocking (even if not in Forman) was consistent with the Release, and
logical, justifying deference. Id. at 1463, 1465 n.l1.
166 Private plaintiffs have successfully relied on the Release in, for example,
Hodges v. H & R Inv., 668 F.2d 545, 550 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (applying the Release in
securities fraud case); Cameron v. Outdoor Reports of Am., 608 F.2d 187, 192 (5th
Cir. 1979), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded on other grounds, 611 F.2d 105
(1980); Dumbarton Condominium Assoc. v. 3120 R Street Assoc., 657 F. Supp. 226,
230-31 (D.D.C. 1987) (applying the Release to determine definition of security in a
RICO case); Bender v. Continental Towers, 632 F. Supp. 497, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(applying the Release to determine whether securities registration was necessary);
Mosher v. Southridge Assocs., 552 F. Supp. 1231, 1233 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (securities
registration case); Johnson v. Nationwide Indus., 450 F. Supp. 948, 953 (N.D. Ill.
1978).
167 Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988).
168 Securities Act of 1933, § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1988) (unlawful to sell,
buy, or offer to sell a security in interstate commerce unless a registration statement
has been filed).
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For an individual unit owner contemplating resale, a key preliminary
issue is whether the initial offering by the developer was itself registered.
If the developer properly registered prior to selling to the initial group of
purchasers (and a forty- or ninety-day period has elapsed thereafter), 169
then the purchasers are free to resell without concern for the registration
provisions of the 1933 Act. 170 On the other hand, if the developer did not
register, then the purchaser must either register or find an exemption.
In actual practice, very few developers offering condominiums coupled
with rental agreements have filed registration statements. 171 In some cases,
ignorance of the law may be the explanation. In other cases, the expense,
delay, and complexity of registration may have led to a conscious economic
decision to forego registration and accept the risks that accrue to
noncompliance. 172 Still others may have chosen to rely on an exemption
from registration.
In any of those cases, the owner of a condominium unit that was not
previously registered has only two options if she wants to sell on the
secondary market without violating the law: file her own registration
statement, or find an exemption. Each of those options deserves
consideration.
B. The Registration and Sales Process
A brief summary of the processes mandated by the 1933 Act for
registered offerings plainly demonstrates that compliance by an individual
unit owner is implausible. The requirements divide into a pre-filing period,
169 Securities Act of 1933, § 4(3), 15 U.S. C. § 77d(3) (1988); Rule 176, 17
C.F.R. § 230.176 (1982).
170 To prevent sales activity after the registration statement becomes effective,
the SEC must commence stop order or refusal order proceedings, or an examination.
Securities Act of 1933, § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1988).
171 During the 15 years between 1967, when the SEC made known its position
that certain condominium offers should be registered, and 1973, when the SEC
reemphasized the point by issuing the Release, the number of condominium offerings
which the SEC would consider subject to the Act was estimated at several hundred,
yet the number of registration statements for such offerings was only 42. Rosenbaum,
supra note 47, at 786 (citing "SEC Issues Guidelines on Advertising, Sales of
Condominium Units," Wall St. J., Apr. 10, 1973, at 14). An expert in condominium
securities noted that, as of 1972, of over 500 resort rental condominium offerings only
21 had registered with the SEC. Gunnar, supra note 1, at 36 n. 26.
172 One expert in condominium securities discussing whether lawyers for
developers of condominiums should advise registration, noted that the SEC's "lack of
enforcement leaves conscientious counsel in a dilemma. The majority have advised
their clients to follow form rather than substance and hold their breath." Gunnar,
supra note 1, at 39 n.45.
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a waiting period after filing but before the "effective date," and the post-
effective period.
In the pre-filing period, before a registration statement is submitted to
the SEC, the seller must avoid all offers and sales. The term "offer," for
this purpose includes even "conditioning the market" by publicity that
tends to arouse interest in buying the security. These rules, clearly, run
directly counter to the economic incentives of any seller of real estate, to
encourage as much public interest as soon as possible. During the pre-
filing period, the seller is precluded from advertising, listing the unit as
being for sale, or otherwise generating interest among potential purchasers.
Preparing the registration statement is an imposing challenge, since it
must disclose at length and in detail all material facts regarding the
security. In the case of condominium unit, material facts would logically
include a massive degree of detail regarding the entire condominium
complex and the rental manager, because the value and the benefits and
risks of ownership of each unit is connected to a significant degree to the
rest of the complex and the condominium association. 173
After a registration statement is filed with the SEC, but before it is
"effective," a waiting period is imposed. During this period, the seller may
accept indications of interest but must carefully avoid any statement or
conduct that could result in a sale or contract to sell. 174 The seller may
provide offerees a "preliminary prospectus" consisting of most of the
contents of the registration statement. The duration of this waiting period is
weeks, perhaps months, and in practice is difficult to predict. The delay
could impose unacceptable costs to condominium sellers.
173 A partial list of the aspects of disclosure necessary in the registration of a
condominium security includes the following: the type, number, and descriptions of
units; the topography, climate, population, recreational facilities, public safety
services, and commercial facilities in the area; all details of costs, financing, taxes,
and monthly expenses and assessments; full information on any rental arrangement;
the condominium association rules and processes; identity and experience of the
issuer, affiliates, and managers; use of the proceeds; and conflicts of interest. Robert
Klein, Preparation of an SEC Registration Statement for an Offering of Condominium
Units, 2 REAL ESTATE L.J. 461, 462-71 (1973) (containing a detailed treatment of
each of the listed factors). Financial statements and copies of significant documents
must be attached. Moreover, any further information that an investor would consider
important in deciding whether or not to purchase must be disclosed, even if it is not
specifically listed on the SEC's registration form. Rule 408, 17 C.F.R. § 230.408.
174 Only when the registration statement becomes effective can contracts be
signed. Securities Act of 1933, § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1988) (permissible to sell
or buy securities after the effective dates). For an explanation of restrictions applicable
in the "waiting period" between filing a registration statement and its effective date,
see THOMAs L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURIrIEs REGULATION § 2.4 (2d ed. 1990).
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When the registration statement becomes effective, the seller is finally
permitted to make offers and complete sales. No written materials relating
to the condo may be used in connection with an offer or sale unless,
however, the purchaser is furnished a formal prospectus-a lengthy,
detailed document consisting of most of the contents of the registration
statement.175
The process is extremely complex and costly, requiring massive
documentation and advice from lawyers, accountants, and other experts.
Costs from fifty thousand to hundreds of thousands of dollars are
routine. 176 The lengthy delays, of at least a few weeks, add further costs
and are especially objectionable in the real estate industry, 177 which is so
markedly cyclical and requires expeditious responses to changing market
conditions.
Presented with the prospect of those heavy burdens, why register?
Pragmatic sellers of condominiums will consider the extent of civil and
criminal sanctions for noncompliance (described below), and the likelihood
of enforcement action, and will weigh the costs. From the point of view of
a developer of a large condominium development, a cost-benefit analysis
could produce either result: registration, or a conscious decision not to
register, whether or not an exemption is available.
From the point of view of the owner of a single condominium unit that
had not been previously registered by the developer, the decision seems far
more certain: registration is simply not plausible. One reason is the
probable inability to provide adequate disclosure even if cost were not an
object. Since the "security" consists of the unit plus the rental pool, the
registration statement would have to include all material facts regarding the
pool.
The Hocking facts serve to emphasize the impracticality. The seller of
the single condominium unit involved in that case was not a participant in
the rental pool, and had no right to access to information regarding it.
Although a unit seller might request the massive and detailed data that
would be necessary, there is no assurance that the pool operator would
comply. Indeed the danger of securities law liability is a strong disincentive
175 For description of the rules applicable in the "post-effective period" (after the
SEC allows the registration statement to become effective), see generally LOUIS LOSS,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 131-39 (2d ed. 1988).
176 Registration of a condominium project in 1973, for example, costed between
$50,000 and $100,000. Brannen, supra note 58, at 749 n.18.
177 See, e.g., Linda A. Wertheimer & Stephen S. Mark, Special Problems of
Unregistered Real Estate Securities, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1219, 1221 (1975) (real estate
syndicators are "unable or unwilling to bear the expense of registering... or are
unable to delay their contractual commitments and business decisions during
registrations").
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for the pool operator to cooperate, especially since the transaction provides
no direct economic benefit to the pool operator.
Even if the individual unit owner were capable of accumulating the
necessary information, the costs, delays, and burdens of registration would
be grossly excessive in relation to the value of the transaction. In practical
effect, an individual unit owner will not register. The only realistic issues,
then, are whether exemptions from registration are available, and the
sanctions that result from failure to register.
C. Exemptions from Registration
Exemptions provide significant benefits to sellers of securities, even
though they do not protect against antifraud liability. If the transaction is
exempt, the seller need not register and is not exposed to the automatic
recission remedy. The burden of proving that a transaction is exempt,
however, is always on the party asserting the exemption. 178
In determining which exemption provisions apply to the sale of a single
condominium unit, a key preliminary question is whether the "issuer" 179 of
the security, for purposes of the 1933 Act, is the developer or the unit
owner. Many of the exemption provisions are available only to issuers,
while others apply only to non-issuers.
1. Exemptions Available to Non-Issuers
Courts that accept the "once a security, always a security" rationale
should determine that the condominium unit (by itself merely a real estate
interest) became a security when the developer combined it with the RPA.
The characterization as a security then continued into the hands of the
purchaser of the condo unit (whether or not the purchaser also entered into
the rental pool), on the premise that conversion from security to non-
security, and perhaps back again, would produce unacceptable confusion
and difficulties.
Implicit in that line of reasoning is a determination that the "issuer," or
creator, of the security was the original developer, not the buyer of an
individual unit. The individual unit owner who proceeds to sell the unit on
178 See, e.g., Kane v. SEC, 842 F.2d 194, 198 (8th Cir. 1988) (broker must
determine whether securities being distributed are exempt); Mary S. Krech Trust v.
Lakes Apts., 642 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff carries burden on every one of the
exemption's elements).
179 The term "issuer" is defined as "every person who issues or proposes to issue
any security." Securities Act of 1933, § 2(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(4) (1988).
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the secondary market, therefore, would be precluded from using certain
exemptions which are available only to issuers.180
The only exemptions available to non-issuers are under section 4(1)131
and Rule 144,182 the so-called "4(1 1/2) phenomenon," 183 the short-form
filing exemption under Regulation A,18 4 and the statutory intrastate
exemption.' 8 5 Each of them entails difficulties or uncertainties.
Section 4(1) exempts "transactions by any person other than an issuer,
underwriter, or dealer." 186 Though an initial reading would suggest that
the exemption is available to a seller of a single condominium unit on the
secondary market, hidden complexities make that conclusion uncertain.
The owner of a single unit is not an issuer, under the rationale discussed
above, and normally is not a dealer,' 8 7 but might be classified as an
underwriter-a term with a technical meaning 88 and interpretation far
broader than its everyday usage would suggest.18 9
180 Included are exemptions for nonpublic offerings (or "private placements"),
Securities Act of 1933, § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77a(2) (1988); accredited investors,
Securities Act of 1933, § 4(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (1988), Rule 215, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.215; intrastate offerings under the SEC's Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147; or
any of the exemptions under the SEC's Regulation D, Rules 504, 505, 506, 17 C.F.R
§ 230.504-.506.
181 Securities Act of 1933, § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1988).
182 17 C.F.R. § 230.144.
183 ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, The Section "4(1 112)"
Phenomenon: Private Resale of "Restricted Securities," 34 BUS. LAw 1961 (1979)
[hereinafter ABA Report].
184 Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.262 (1981).
185 Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(11).
186 Securities Act of 1933, § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1988).
187 The term "dealer" means as any person who engages, full or part-time,
directly or indirectly, as broker, agent, or principal, in the business of trading in
securities issued by another person. Securities Act of 1933, § 2(12), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(12) (1988).
188 The term underwriter includes "any person who purchased from an issuer
with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of
any security. . . ." Securities Act of 1933, § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1 1).
189 In common parlance in the securities industry, an underwriter is a
professional who, as a regular business, arranges with issuers to market their securities
to investors, receiving either commissions or profit on the transactions. That usage,
however, is far narrower than the meaning used in applying the 4(1) exemption. The
need for a more inclusive construction arises from the danger that a promoter might
seek to avoid registration by selling first to an intermediate party, such as a director or
officer of the issuer, who proceeds to sell to members of the public. If the meaning of
the term underwriter was construed narrowly to exclude the director or officer, then
4(1) could be used to justify part of a scheme to evade registration of securities sales
by an issuer indirectly to the public.
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Under highly technical and abstruse interpretations by the courts and
the SEC, including a line of reasoning known as the "4(1 1/2)
phenomenon," 190 a purchaser of securities may be categorized as an
underwriter even without any affiliation or relationship to the issuer.
Factors supporting such a conclusion include a purchaser's intent at the
time of purchase to resell rather than to hold the security as an investment
or merely the fact of a short holding period before a resale. In the Hocking
situation, as one illustration, both the defendant and the plaintiff purchaser
could be found to be underwriters because their holding periods were
short, and their intent from the outset was to resell quickly.
The lack of precise or reliable standards in the case law addressing the
definition of an underwriter is perhaps the most serious problem for a
condominium seller. The 4(1) exemption is often useful to avoid liability
after an unregistered security transaction is completed, but is far from
satisfactory as a planning device because of uncertainties in its
application.191
190 Part of the difficulty derives from the Act's omission to define the term
"distribution," which appears in the definition of "underwriter." Many commentators
have reasoned that the term distribution is equivalent to the concept of nonpublic
offering, which appears in a different exemption provision, section 4(2), and has
generated a substantial body of judicial interpretation, but again no precise or reliable
criteria. This approach is commonly termed the "section 4(1 1/2) phenomenon"
(because it blends terminology from 4(1) with case law interpreting 4(2)). See, e.g.,
ABA Report, supra note 183. The approach has some support in case law and SEC
No-Action letters, but provides no solace to a condominium seller seeking certainty
about the 4(1) exemption. For example, the ABA Committee reviewed six cases and a
number of SEC No-Action letters regarding private resales of securities, and found
numerous inconsistencies and uncertainties, even as to the particular statutory
exemption that was applicable. Id. None of the six cases was explicit in recognizing
the "4(1 1/2)" phenomenon. Dean Olander & Margret Stevens Jacks, The Section "4(1
1/2)" Exemption-Reading Between the Lines of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 SEC.
REG. L.J. 339, 351 n. 50 (1988). Commentators have described the "4(1 1/2)"
exemption as being "lore, rather than law," and "of dubious origin and uncertain
application." Id. at 341. The SEC has not specified the circumstances under which the
exemption applies, and the A.B.A. Committee addressing the subject merely
recommended general guidelines. Id. at 341-42.
191 No precise or reliable standards crystallized in the case law, and the
determination remains largely subjective and difficult to predict. See, e.g., ABA
Report, supra note 183; Olander & Jacks, supra note 190, at 344; Preliminary Note to
Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1990). The SEC takes the position that anyone
relying on section 4(1) rather than on SEC rule has a "substantial burden" of proof
that the statute is satisfied. Adoption of Rule 144, SEC Securities Act Release No.
5223 [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 78487 (Jan. 11, 1972).
One commentator refers to the case law and the SEC position on § 4(1) as "a trap for
the careless and unwary." HAZEN, supra note 174, at 212.
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Rule 144,192 issued by the SEC in response to the high degree of
uncertainty in the case law, 193 helps, somewhat, to set objective standards.
Nevertheless, Rule 144 provides only limited benefit to sellers of
condominiums and other types of securities. From a pragmatic point of
view, the most important criterion in the Rule is the "holding period"-the
length of time that has elapsed after the investor became the beneficial
owner of the security. 194 If the investor pays with a promissory note or
other installment obligation in favor of the seller (not uncommon in real
estate transactions), the holding period begins only when payment has been
completed.
If the investor's holding period is less than two years, Rule 144 is not
available at all. 195 If the holding period is more than two years but less
than three years, Rule 144 is available but the requirements are so
extensive and complicated as to be plainly prohibitive for the owner of a
single condominium unit seeking to sell on the secondary market.
To qualify for Rule 144, a unit owner would need to convince the
rental pool operator to supply extensive information on its business and
finances for exposure to public scrutiny. 196 The owner would have to
ascertain how many other units were sold by other parties recently.
197
They would have had to find a registered securities broker' 98 who was
willing to accept the transaction, even though secondary sales of
condominium units normally are handled by real estate brokers. The
securities broker would have to agree not to solicit offers to buy but rather
to merely passively await offers' 99-a blatantly unrealistic scenario for
selling real estate. All except the most sophisticated condominium unit
192 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1990).
193 Preliminary Note to Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1990).
194 Rule 144(d), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d) (1990).
195 Id.
196 Information regarding the securities, similar to what is provided under 1934
Act periodic disclosure, must be available to the public. Rule 144(c), 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.144(c) (1990); see also Olander & Jacks, supra note 190, at 346 (making a
similar point in the more general context of sales of securities of any company that is
not a reporting company under the 1934 Act).
197 The amount of securities that can be sold is strictly limited, in any three-
month period, to 1% of the issues' outstanding securities, or the average weekly
trading volume in the preceding four weeks, whichever is smaller. Rule 144(e) 17
C.F.R. § 230.144(e) (1990).
198 The seller must use a registered securities broker to arrange the sale, and the
broker cannot solicit for offers to buy. Rule 144(0, 17 U.S.C. § 230.144(0 (1990).
199 The sales process envisioned by Rule 144 is not workable in any situation in
which there is not an active trading market. Olander & Jacks, supra note 190, at 346.
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owners, of course, would not even reach these issues, because they would
fail to submit the required notice to the SEC in a timely manner.20°
If the investor completes a holding period of a full three years, then the
usefulness of Rule 144 dramatically increases. The requirements for public
information and for use of a securities broker are removed, as are limits on
the amount of securities that can be sold. 201 Perhaps most importantly, the
requirement for filing a notice of sale with the SEC is removed, making it
possible for a condominium unit owner who lacks securities law legal
advice to inadvertently qualify for the exemption, without even being
aware of its existence. The three-year requirement, however, excludes a
large portion of unit owners (including for example the owners in the
Hocking case, who resold within one year after their purchase).
Regulation A is another possibility. It provides an exemption to issuers
and non-issuers, permits advertising, and has no limitation on the number
and residence of offerees. 202 The maximum value of securities that a non-
issuer can sell under the regulation is $100,000-a limitation which will
exclude some owners of condominium units.
The primary difficulty of Regulation A are its disclosure requirements,
which parallel in many respects the full statutory registration process. 203
Though somewhat less burdensome than a full registration, the disclosure
requirements still present a nearly insuperable pragmatic barrier to the
owner of a single condominium unit seeking to resell. 204 The costs and
delays involved in Regulation A remove any doubt that the exemption is
not practical for a condominium unit resale.205
The statutory intrastate exemption 2 6 is the final exemption for non-
issuers to consider. An SEC rule207 on intrastate transactions limits its
200 A notice of a proposed sale must be filed with the SEC prior to or
concurrently with the order to sell. Rule 144(h), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(h) (1990)
201 Rule 144(k), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(k).
202 Rules 251-264, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251-.264 (1981).
203 A person seeking to comply with Regulation A must submit to the SEC a
Notification (similar to a Registration Statement but somewhat less detailed) and
provide investors with an Offering Statement (generally comparable to a prospectus).
These documents include substantial information about the security.
204 Because the "security" entails the condominium unit plus the rental pool, the
unit owner would be required to provide full disclosure regarding the RPA. Even if
the rental pool operator chose to cooperate, the expense of producing the
documentation would likely exceed the value of the transaction in a single unit.
205 Regulation A has been evaluated as hardly preferable to full registration, for
small transactions. Olander & Jacks, supra note 190, at 347 n.35.
206 Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(ii) (1988).
207 Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1989).
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exemption to issuers, but the statute does not contain that limitation.20 8 The
exemption is attractive because it allows advertising (if limited to residents
of the same state),20 9 does not mandate specific disclosures to offerees
(though the antifraud provisions always apply), and has no maximum dollar
limitation. Nevertheless, only in a rare case would the statutory exemption
be useful to a seller of a single condominium unit.
The exemption would apply only if all offers and sales were made to
individuals who resided in the same state as the developer of the
condominium. The requirements apply not merely to the particular unit but
to the entire "issue," presumably the entire condominium development.
Even one offer to an out-of-state resident disqualifies the entire issue,
whether or not that offeree decides to buy.210 Clearly most owners of
individual units of a resort condominium could not rely on this exemption,
and those who do rely are subject to substantial uncertainties due to
varying judicial interpretations. 211
Summarizing, the only exemption likely to be useful to resellers of
single condominium units, and to provide a comfortable degree of
certainty, is Rule 144, and even that is practical only after three years have
elapsed since the owner paid for the unit. Alternatively, a unit owner might
hope to qualify as a non-underwriter under diffuse case law interpretation,
recognizing that the burden of proof is on the person seeking the
exemption.
2. Exemptions Available to Issuers
If the condominium unit seller is deemed to be the "issuer" 212 of the
security, other exemptions are available, though they are also not likely to
be workable. The principal exemptions potentially useful in that instance
would be the nonpublic, intrastate, accredited investor statutes and rules
and, of particular value, the small-offerings exemption under Regulation D.
208 The statutory provision applies to any "security which is part of an issue
offered and sold only to persons resident within a single State or Territory, where the
issuer of such security is a person resident... within such State or Territory."
Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1988). The provision does
not limit the exemption to issuers, though the residency of the issuer is vital.
209 Letter of General Counsel discussing nature of the exemption from
registration provided by § 3(a)(11). Exchange Act Release No. 33-1459 (May 29,
1937) (Westlaw, FSEC-IR Database) [hereinafter Exemptions].
210 The statutory response is to "offers," not "purchases."
211 See HAZEN, supra note 174, at 143-49.
212 A unit owner would be the "issuer" if the court focuses on the offer, and
identifies the party who combines the various elements of the Howey test to form an
investment contract.
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A recurring problem with those exemptions are limitations or prohibitions
on advertising, which is standard and commonly vital in marketing real
estate.
The 1933 Act exempts from registration "transactions not involving
any public offering," 2 13 but does not define the term "public offering."
Generally, case law has limited the exemption to situations in which every
offeree (not merely the purchaser) is sufficiently sophisticated to evaluate
the opportunity and financially able to bear the investment risk, so as not
to need the protections of the registration provisions. 2 14 The offeree must
receive or have access to information comparable to what would be
disclosed in a registration statement. 2 15 Moreover, the number of offerees
must be limited, and the SEC has taken the position that "public
advertising is inconsistent with a claim of private offering." 2 16 Marketing a
condominium unit under these constraints would require drastic departures
from conventional practice, and nevertheless expose the offeror to
significant risk.
The intrastate offerings exemptions is another possibility. Issuers may
use the statutory intrastate exemption (discussed above) or, for far greater
certainty, an SEC "safe harbor" rule.2 17 The rule requires that the issuer,
all offerees, and the business be all in a single state, and 80% of the
proceeds of the offering be used in the state. 218 Plainly, such restrictions
make the rule useless for resort condominiums since potential purchasers
may be from a different state. Moreover, downstream sales to nonresidents
213 Securities Act of 1933, § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77 d(2) (1988).
2 14 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-25 (1953).
215 Van Dyke v. Coburn Enters., Inc., 873 F.2d 1094, 1098 (8th Cir. 1989);
Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 903 (5th Cir. 1977), appeal
after remand, 576 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1978); Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591,
613 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 831 (1977); SEC v. Continental Tobacco
Co. of S.C., Inc., 463 F.2d 137, 159-60 (5th Cir. 1972); Gilligan, Will & Co. v.
SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959).
216 Nonpublic Exemption Offering, Securities Act Release No. 33-4552 (Nov. 6,
1962) (Westlaw, FSEC-IR Database); see generally Stuart R. Cohn, Securities Markets
for Small Issuers: The Barrier of Federal Solicitation and Advertising Prohibitions, 38
U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1986); Patrick Daugherty, Rethinking the Ban on General
Solicitation, 38 EMoRY L.J. 67 (1989). Brokers can contact their customers, however,
if they meet the suitability standard, though burden of proof is on the issuer. Mary S.
Krech Trust v. Lakes Apartments, 642 F.2d 98, 101-03, reh'g denied, 645 F.2d 72
(5th Cir. 1981).
217 Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1989). The rule is available to issuers only,
though the statutory provision may apply to others. Id., Preliminary Note 4.
218 Id., subsections (c), (d); see also SEC v. McDonald Inv. Co., 343 F. Supp.
343, 346 (D. Minn. 1972) (statutory intrastate exemption not available when proceeds
of sales were used largely in another state).
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within nine months, even if inadvertent, can invalidate the exemption, 219
giving all purchasers a right to recision. 220
The exemptions for "accredited investors" 221 may be useful in some
instances to sellers of condominiums. Accredited investors include natural
persons with incomes over $200,000 or net worth over $1 million, so some
potential purchasers of high-end condominium units are covered. No
specific information need be provided, only a simple notice is required,
and "insignificant and inadvertent deviations" from the Rule's
requirements will be tolerated. 222 A prohibition on general solicitation or
advertising, 223 however, constitutes an insuperable barrier for most real
estate transactions. 224
The exemption most likely to be useful to the owner of a single
condominium unit selling in the secondary market is Rule 504,225 a small-
offerings exemption within Regulation D. It allows sales not exceeding $1
million, to any type of investor, without providing any information, and
countenances "insignificant deviations" from the requirement. 226 General
solicitation and advertising is prohibited, however, unless the offeror is in
a state having certain types of state blue-sky disclosure requirements and
the seller complies. 227 A form must be filed with the SEC in a timely
manner22S-a requirement that is not difficult to satisfy but operates to
219 See Hillsborough Inv. Corp. v. SEC, 276 F.2d 665, 668 (1st Cir. 1960);
HAZEN, supra note 174 § 4.12, at 147. Resales do not destroy prior exemptions,
however, if the securities "[camel to rest." Section 3(a)(11) Exemptions from Local
Offerings, Exchange Act Release No. 33-4434 (Dec. 6, 1961) (Westlaw, FSEC-IR
Database); Busch v. Carpenter, 827 F.2d 653, 657 (10th Cir. 1987), aff'g in part, 598
F. Supp. 519 (D. Utah 1984).
220 Exemptions, supra note 209. The right to rescission is under Securities Act
section 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1).
221 Securities Act of 1933, § 4(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (1988); Rule 506, 17
C.F.R. § 230.506.
222 Rules 502(b)(1) (information), 503 (notice of sales), 508 (devictions), 17
C.F.R. §§ 230.502(b)(1), .503, .508 (1989). The general antifraud provisions, of
course, continue to apply.
223 Rule 502(c), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (1989).
224 Additional disincentives.
225 Rule 504, 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1989).
226 Rules 504(a)(2)(1) (dollar limitation), 502(b)(1) (omitting any information
requirements for Rule 504 offerings), 508 (deviations), 17 C.F.R.
§§ 230.504(a)(2)(1), .502(b)(1), .508 (1989).
227 Rule 504(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1) (1989).
228 Rule 503, 17 C.F.R. § 230.503 (1989) (requiring filing of 5 copies of Form D
within 15 days of the first sale).
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prevent inadvertent compliance by sellers who are not aware of the specific
rules.229
3. Summation: Exemptions Are Not Pragmatically Available
Pragmatically, the various exemptions are useful only to a small
portion of the sellers in the secondary market for condominium units.
Numerous and complex requirements and prohibitions, particularly those
preventing advertising, are unworkable in the real estate market.
Moreover, the heavy burden of proof imposed on sellers makes assertion of
an exemption uncertain and risky.
As a result, even the select few owners of individual condominium
units that are cognizant and sophisticated regarding securities law will face
the prospect of selling securities that are neither registered nor exempt.
Added to this number is the far larger number of owners who have no
knowledge of securities law and are unlikely to invest the sums needed to
purchase expert legal, accounting, and other advice, and so do not even
attempt to comply with the securities law. Together, these groups probably
include the overwhelming preponderance of owners of condominium units.
D. Consequences of Non-Compliance by a Condominium Unit Seller
Noncompliance with the federal securities registration and disclosure
requirements exposes a seller to both criminal and civil liability. The
government may prosecute for any violation of the 1933 Act or the SEC's
rules, including failure to register. 230  One provision penalizes
misstatements or omissions in connection with offers or sales (whether in a
registration statement or any other context), imposing liability even when
the defendant acted without scienter or intent to defraud. 231 Penalties can
be as high as $10,000 in fines, or five years in prison, or both, for willful
violations. 232 The SEC also can seek to enjoin marketing efforts for
unregistered offerings, through stop order proceedings.
229 An argument may be made that failure to file the report is excusable as an
"insignificant deviation" under Rule 508, but is unlikely to succeed. The party seeking
the exemption must prove a "good faith and reasonable attempt to comply with
all... requirements of Rule 504.505, or .506." Rule 508(a)(3), 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.508(a)(3) (1989).
230 Securities Act of 1933, § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1988).
231 Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (1988).
232 Securities Act of 1933, § 24. Criminal prosecutions are handled by the
Attorney General rather than the SEC. Securities Act of 1933, § 20(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77t(b) (1988).
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As a pragmatic matter, however, the likelihood of prosecution by the
SEC is remote.23 3 The SEC has priorities, such as insider trading by
market professionals and protecting the integrity of the national stock
markets, which so vastly outweigh the significance of an isolated
condominium unit sale that the agency would not expend its resources to be
involved. Even if the SEC chose to emphasize condominium sales, it lacks
the resources to police individual unit sales.
Far more realistic is the possibility of civil actions initiated by a
purchaser of a condominium unit who subsequently becomes dissatisfied
with it. The reason for dissatisfaction might be a false or misleading
statement or omission made during the course of negotiations. (In the
Hocking situation, for example, the plaintiff alleged certain
misrepresentations.) Equally likely is that dissatisfaction arises from a
decline in value due to external market forces, or merely from the
purchaser's belated belief that the price paid was too high. Realistically,
the buyer might be motivated to sue merely because market prices
declined-a reason completely unrelated to any conduct or statement of the
seller.23 4
The 1933 Act provides ample opportunity for civil litigation. Section
1223 5 imposes strict liability for offering or selling a security without
complying with the requirements to register. No defenses are available;
even a condominium unit owner who is able to prove complete honesty,
good faith, and candor will be held civilly liable.23 6 Another subsection of
section 1223 7 imposes liability for any misstatement or omission of material
fact in any written or oral communication involved in the offer or sale of a
security, whether or not a registration statement has been filed. A plaintiff
is not required to prove intent to defraud, but a defendant is allowed a
defense that "he did not know and, in the exercise of reasonable care could
233 One expert in condominium securities noted "a reluctance on the part of SEC
staff to pursue regulation of resort housing securities," due to their many other more
pressing responsibilities, and stated that the "Commission refuses to allow enforcement
actions in these cases .... " Gunnar, supra note 1, at 39 n.45.
234 An article oriented to the mineral industry offered an example of an interest in
an oil and gas venture that was sold in violation of § 12. If the hole subsequently
turned out to be dry, the investor could sue and get his money back, regardless of the
equities or contracts of the parties. Allott, supra note 7, 21-1, 21-23. An article
oriented to equine syndicates raised the same point in connection with thoroughbred
horse transactions that do not live up to expectations. Cooper, supra note 7, at 318
n.351.
235 Securities Act of 1933, § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1988).
236 See, e.g., Allott, supra note 7, at 21-24.
237 Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988).
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not have known" of the misstatement or omission.23 8 Notably, a plaintiff
need not prove any causal connection between the violation and the
plaintiff's harm.2
3 9
The remedy for violation of either part of section 12 is essentially
rescission240 or, if the defendant no longer owns the security, damages.
The statute of limitations is only one year. 24 1 In effect, the seller of a
condominium unit who fails to register is saddled with the full economic
risk of declines in market value for at least one year after the sale. The
result can be disastrous. 24
2
The 1933 Act's antifraud provision2 43 may also be available to private
plaintiffs, allowing recovery for any false or misleading statement or
omission by a condominium unit seller, even if merely negligent.244
Several federal circuits have held that this action is available to private
plaintiffs, 24 5 although others disagree, 246 and the Supreme Court has not
yet resolved the conflict.
238 The "reasonable care" standard of § 12(2) is similar to negligence but
includes a duty to investigate. See, e.g., Davis v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 739 F.2d
1057, 1068 (6th Cir. 1984); Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349, 1361 (5th Cir. 1981);
Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222, 1228 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1005 (1981); Wigand v. Flo-Tek, Inc., 609 F.2d 1028, 1034 (2d Cir. 1979).
239 See, e.g., Diskin v. Lomasney & Co., 452 F.2d 871, 876 (2d Cir. 1971);
HAZEN, supra note 174, § 7.2 at 279.
240 The purchaser of a condominium that is ruled to be a security would be
entitled to refund of the price paid, plus interest, less any income (presumably rent)
received by the defendant during the period of his ownership, in exchange for a
reconveyance of title.
241 Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773
(1991) (limitations period applicable to Rule lOb-5 actions is one year from date of
discovery of the facts constituting the violation but not to exceed three years after such
violation).
242 As an example, when one condominium developer was compelled to offer
rescission, 48 out of 152 purchasers cancelled their contracts and refunds of over
$200,000 were required. The developer, Hale Kaanapoli Hotel Development Co., was
also required to halt marketing and file a registration statement. Rohan, supra note 1,
at 7-8.
243 Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(2) (1988).
244 Scienter is necessary under some subsections of § 17(a), but not subsection
(3), due to differences in language. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980).
Subsection (3) prohibits conduct that would operate as a fraud or deceit. Id.
245 See, e.g., Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 909, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979); Daniel v. International Bhd.
of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1244-45 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 439
U.S. 551 (1979); Hanraty v. Ostertag, 470 F.2d 1096, 1098 (10th Cir. 1972);
Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d 455, 456 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 999
(1971).
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The most commonly used liability provision, however, is Rule lOb-
5247-the general antifraud rule that is based on the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 (hereinafter 1934 Act) (unlike all of the provisions
discussed above, which are in the 1933 Act). Both the government and
private plaintiffs can bring actions for false or misleading statements in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security. If a condominium unit is
offered with a rental arrangement, forming an investment contract, the
seller is subject to Rule l0b-5, probably even if the purchaser buys the
condominium but not the rental services. 248
Scienter is always a necessary element of the case. 249 Causation of a
loss is another necessary element, but is presumed if the plaintiff
demonstrates nondisclosure of any material fact.2 ° Other principal
attractions of Rule 10b-5, as compared to both the 1933 Act provisions and
state law remedies, include wider choice of venue, nationwide service of
process, and perceived sophistication of federal judges. Yet another
advantage was a longer statute of limitations, but one court recently
eliminated that advantage.2s1 In the Hocking situation, one factor causing
246 See, e.g., In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d
1349, 1351 (9th Cir. 1987) (no implied private cause of action under section 17(a));
Landry v. All Am. Assurance, 688 F.2d 381, 391 (5th Cir. 1982); Shull v. Dain,
Kalman & Quail, Inc. 561 F.2d 152, 159 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086
(1978).
247 17 C.F.R. § 240.106-5 (1988).
248 One possible defense would be the Supreme Court's decision that Rule lob-5
is not available when the defendant offered a security but the plaintiff did not buy one.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1974); see also Koppel v.
Wien, 575 F. Supp. 960, 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (real estate joint venture participating
interest was an investment contract but non-purchaser could not bring Rule 10b-5
action). A commentator has noted that apparently only one reported case has applied
this rule when different elements were combined in an offer to constitute an
investment contract but only one of those elements was actually purchased. MacLaren,
supra note 115, at 217, 224-27, (citing Jones v. International Investors Inc. East, 429
F. Supp. 119, 124 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (offer of separate contracts to evaluate and to
market an invention constituted an offer of an investment contract and was actionable
under Rule lOb-5 even though plaintiff never signed the marketing contract, because
the evaluation contract was nearly worthless without the additional services)).
249 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (in private action for
damages plaintiff must prove that defendant intended to deceive, manipulate or
defraud).
250 Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153, reh'g
denied, 407 U.S. 916 (1972).
251 Because a private cause of action under Rule lOb-5 was implied, rather than
express in the Act or rules, no precise limitation period was established. Following the
Erie doctrine, federal courts selected a period on the basis of state law in the
jurisdiction in which the court was located, sometimes using state securities ("blue
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the plaintiff to assert Rule lOb-5 was the possibility of bringing the action
in federal district court in Arizona, where the plaintiff resided, rather than
Hawaii, where the condominium was located. After establishing a federal
claim, the plaintiff appended Hawaii state law causes of action.
In summation, classifying the resale of single condominium units as a
securities transaction security exposes the seller to numerous securities law
liabilities. For a period of one year after the sale, the buyer of a unit has a
right to rescind whether or not fraud has occurred, and so the seller
assumes the economic risk of the buyer becoming dissatisfied during that
period. Moreover, in most jurisdictions, the seller will be liable for any
misstatement or omission in the offer or sale, if the buyer can prove an
intent to defraud.
E. Assessing the Consequences
If routine resales of condominium units are deemed to involve
securities merely because the seller draws attention to rental services
available from an unrelated third party, the consequences may be extensive
and extremely negative to the condominium industry.
The relatively few unit owners who are sufficiently well informed to
understand their obligations and risks under securities law will find
compliance far too expensive to even consider. The only practical and
prudent solution is to assiduously avoid discussion of rental arrangements
in the marketing of the unit, but it is highly improbable that many unit
owners would do so. The vast preponderance of unit owners will proceed
in blissful ignorance of even the possibility of securities law applicability
and will draw attention to every attractive feature of the property,
including available rental arrangements, in accordance with conventional
practices and the financial incentives of the situation.
Conventional practices, however, will inadvertently but consistently
violate securities law, even if undertaken in complete good faith and
sky") laws, other times using the periods applicable to fraud or other causes of action.
The results varied among jurisdictions but generally extended to several years after the
sale, or discovery of the violation. See HAZEN, supra note 174 § 13.8. The Third
Circuit in 1988 determined that the variation from one federal court to the next was
inappropriate and that a limitation period should be based on federal rather than state
law. The most comparable statute, the court ruled, was the 1933 Act, with its one-year
period of limitation. If this analysis is adopted by other circuit courts, or by the
Supreme Court, it could dramatically reduce the reach of Rule l0b-5, for owners of
condominium units and all other potential defendants. At this point, however, the
Third Circuit decision stands alone from the rest of the case law. The SEC has argued
for a uniform 5-year period. Ruder, supra note 138, at 1167 (citing various amicus
briefs).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
subjective honesty. Unit owners, therefore, will be exposed to occasional
litigation based on a completely unexpected theory. They will be subject to
liability for securities fraud and, even more distressing, rescission on a
strict liability basis merely for selling securities without registration or on
an exemption.
Developers may also be affected. If prospective purchasers of units
from developers become aware of the difficulties of resale, they may be
dissuaded from buying or may demand compensatory price reductions. To
counter this sales resistance and maintain demand, developers may need to
provide resale services.
One indication of the seriousness ascribed to these potential
repercussions was the reaction in Hawaii, a state with a large resort
condominium industry. 25 2 Almost immediately after the first appellate
decision in Hocking was published, resolutions were introduced in both
houses of the Hawaii legislature urging both Congress and the SEC to
exclude condominium resales from the securities laws. The resolutions
stated that the "severe 'roadblock'" to condominium resales threatened by
the Hocking decision was unnecessary and damaging to the industry.25 3
F. Brokers
The real estate brokerage industry has a critical stake in the issue of
whether isolated resales of resort condominium units involve securities. If
discussion of an RPA, available from an unrelated third party, converts a
condominium unit into a security, then real estate agents are exposed to
liabilities of a nature and extent that few of them currently understand.
252 Hawaii Real Estate Reacts to Hocking v. Dubois, 7 CoNDOMNWUM HOTEL
REP. No. 3 at 2-3 (Peter M. Gunnar ed., Fall 1988). According to testimony in
support of the resolution from Calvin Kimura, Executive Secretary of the Hawaii Real
Estate Commission, Hawaii has more than 1,900 condominium projects, representing
about 100,000 apartment units of which more than 21,000 are operated as hotel
accommodations. Id.
253 Id. The representative of the real estate industry stated that "present laws
governing the resale of condominium apartments, including those laws that regulate
real estate brokers and salesmen, provide ample regulatory protection." An opposing
view is held by Peter M. Gunnar, the editor of the Condominium Hotel Reporter and a
lawyer with great depth of experience and expertise in condominium securities law,
who had chaired an industry task force and was closely involved in the Dickey Report
that led to Release 5347. Mr. Gunnar takes the position that adequacy of one state's
regulations should not affect federal securities laws, and that the Hocking decision was
merely an application of law that has been settled for fifteen years. Id.; Ninth Circuit
Affirms Offering of Rental Pool Creates Security, 7 CONDOMINIUM HOTEL REP. No.
2, pp. 1-2 (Peter M. Gunnar ed., Summer 1988).
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Real estate agents are faced with a few alternatives. The most prudent
approach would be to steadfastly refuse to discuss an available RPA with
prospective purchasers, at the risk of foregoing a sale. Another approach
would be to register as a securities broker, and to comply with a host of
complex and burdensome requirements. The most probable alternative-
due either to inadvertence or to conscious cost-benefit analysis-is to
proceed to handle condominium transactions in the traditional manner and
hope for the best.
1. The "Silence Is Golden" Option
In theory, assiduous avoidance of information regarding rental is the
best and safest course of action for real estate agents marketing
condominiums. If real estate is offered without any reference that might be
deemed an offer of managerial services, there is no danger that securities
law will apply. Whether this method is likely to be followed in practice
deserves some examination.
In some contexts, withholding information on rental possibilities is
both practical and common. In the initial-offerings market, condominium
developers striving to satisfy the standards in the Release go to substantial
lengths to avoid any suggestion of "emphasis on economic benefits from
the efforts of others" in their marketing. Developers instruct their sales
staff not to discuss rental services unless a prospective purchaser
specifically inquires, 254 and not to discuss rental income at all.255 Sales
254 See, e.g., Condominium Associates, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL
108269 (May 14, 1987) (investor would be informed of rental services from a
property manager having a contractual relationship but no ownership by the
developer, but only if the investor inquired); Choice Hotel Group, SEC No-Action
Letter, supra note 135; Recreational Indus., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 155
(investor who inquires will be given package of information on rental services);
Rockresorts, SEC No Action Letter, supra note 135 (investor would be informed of
rental services from a company having a contract but no affiliation with the developer,
plus two other unaffiliated rental agents, only if the investor inquired). This approach
has been used for many years. See, e.g., North Shore Project, SEC No-Action Letter,
1972 WL 12276 (Feb. 12, 1973), sumarized in BNA See. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 194
at C-2 (March 21, 1973), and cited in Rosenbaum, supra note 47, at 794 n.35 (1979).
255 One expert on securities aspects of condominiums asserts that any forecast of
cash flow will violate the SEC's standards. Peter M. Gunnar, SEC No-Action Letter,
supra note 135. The staff declined to either confirm or deny this statement of their
position, however, on the grounds that it was presented in the abstract rather than in
the context of specific facts and transactions. Id. Requests for no-action positions,
however, routinely promise not to provide any projection of potential investment
performance to prospective purchasers. See, e.g., Condominium Associates, SEC No-
Action Letter, supra note 254; Rockresorts, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 155
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
personnel are restricted to advising prospective purchasers that they may
rent their unit if they choose to do so, and may use any agent that they
choose. 25 6 Sanctions against sales staff are specified in advance, in case of
deviation from the restrictions.25 7
In the secondary market, similar policies are possible but not likely to
be widely followed. The obvious first hurdle is that the preponderance of
real estate agents are not attuned to or knowledgeable about securities law,
and so will not even consider the issue. Those who are aware of the
securities law pitfalls will then have to weigh the real but uncommon
occurrence of securities liability against the immediate negative impact on
marketing should the agent consciously omit to describe and promote an
attractive feature of the property. Most agents probably will not forego the
(requested by Peter M. Gunnar, author of the 1987 letter, on behalf of a client); Rank
Dev., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 135. Projections that rental income will
cover mortgage, maintenance and other carrying costs are specifically excluded. See,
e.g., Marco Polo Hotel, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 135.
256 See, e.g., Marco Polo, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 135; Choice Hotel
Group, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 135; Rockresorts, SEC No-Action Letter,
supra note 155. This approach has been used for many years. See, e.g., Big Sky of
Montana, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 WL 9644 (March 14, 1973), swmmarized
in BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 199 at C-1 (April 25, 1973), and cited in
Rosenbaum, supra note 47, at 794 n.36.
257 To support their requests for no-action positions, developers routinely
describe at considerable length the measures they will take in case any sales personnel
violate the restrictions on marketing emphasis; dismissing the employee, denying the
employee any commission income on a sale, and offering recission to the purchaser
are typical. See, e.g., Marco Polo, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 135;
Condominium Associates, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 254; Point East
Associates, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 135; Rockresorts, SEC No-Action
Letter, supra note 135; Rank Dev., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 135. Even
after receiving those representations, however, standard practice of the SEC staff is to
caution the developer that any oral representations that deviate from the developer's
description of sales practices will invalidate the no-action position. See, e.g., Choice
Hotel Group, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 135; Condominium Associates, SEC
No-Action Letter, supra note 254; Recreational Indus., SEC No-Action Letter, supra
note 135; Resort Holdings I, Ltd. and Resort Holdings II, Ltd., SEC No-Action
Letter, supra note 135; Sunrise Terrace Trust, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 135;
Planners Dev. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 135; Pacific Lighting
Properties, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 135; Investment Properties Int'l, Ltd.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1351985 WL 55492 (June 10, 1985) (Westlaw, FSEC-NAL
Database); Rank Dev., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 135. The pattern has
been followed since at least 1974. Brannen, supra note 58, at 762 (citing Virginia
Beach Resort Conference Hotel, SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 WL 45576 (July 27,
1984)).
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additional commission income that could result from normal unrestrained
marketing.
Advising studied silence regarding rental services makes eminently
good sense from a lawyer's perspective, but will be perceived by a real
estate agent as comparable to advice not to mention the magnificent view,
the proximity to the beach or shopping, or other features contributing to
the attractiveness and marketability of the property. The advice runs
counter to standard practice and economic incentives inherent in the
industry and is unlikely to be widely followed.
2. Registration as a Securities Broker
If real estate agents effect transactions in property classified as
"investment contracts," they may well be required to register as securities
brokers or dealers. Registration entails filing an application 25 8 and a
statement of financial condition that includes extensive information and
undertakings regarding facilities, capital, financing, and record keeping.25 9
Applicants must demonstrate competency and training in securities
processes and regulations by passing an examination. 260
The 1934 Act defines a securities "broker" as "any person engaged in
the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of
others," 261 and a "dealer" as "any person engaged in the business of
buying or selling securities for his own account" as a part of a regular
business. 262 (Because the same individuals typically perform both
functions, the term "broker-dealer" is commonly used.) Real estate agents
who advertise or sell condominium units with associated rental services on
more than an isolated occasion are in serious jeopardy of inclusion within
those definitions. 263
258 Rule 15bl-1, 17 C.F.R. §240.15b1-1 (1987). The application, on Form B-D,
requires basic business information and data on any previous securities law violations
by the registrant or the registrant's associates.
259 Rule 15b1-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b1-2 (1987).
26 0 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1988).
261 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(4) (1988).
2 62 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(5) (1988).
263 Advertising "on a single, isolated" transaction does not indicate that a person
is "engaged in the business," but more frequent advertising, "holding oneself out as
willing to engage in securities transactions" is sufficient, and earning a commission
based on the volume of securities transactions is additional evidence. HAZEN, supra
note 174, § 10.2.2 at 512. Real estate agents, of course, routinely advertise their
services and their listings.
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One significant exclusion is available to "associated persons of an
issuer," under SEC staff interpretations and an SEC safe-harbor rule.264
The class of "associated person of an issuer" includes an issuer's partners,
officers, director and, notably, employees. To qualify, a person cannot
receive commissions based on sales or be associated with a broker-dealer,
and must meet several other conditions. 265 A condominium developer's
sales staff could very well qualify as "associated persons" and, therefore,
be deemed not to be securities "brokers," 266 but an independent real estate
agent in the resale market would not qualify. 267
In fact, no-action letters tend to classify persons who perform certain
functions ordinarily performed by real estate agents, such as holding the
earnest money, as securities brokers. 268 Moreover, the rule is not even
264 Rule 3a4-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a4-1 (1989) (adopted in 1985). Because the
rules safe-harbor provisions of Rule 3a4-1 are not exclusive, the no-action letters that
preceded it may still be useful in situations not specifically covered by the Rule. Both
the Rule and the no-action letters are analyzed in Gregory S. Crespi, The Reach of the
Federal Registration Requirements for Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisors, 17
SEC. REG. L.J. 339, 343-44 (1990).
265 Rule 3a4-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a4-1 (1989). The additional conditions are
stated in three alternatives, each one suited to a different type of business.
266 The developer who sells condominium units plus rental services would be the
"issuer" of a security. By carefully structuring and supervising the sales staff, the
developer could avoid using registered securities brokers. Among numerous
requirements, the staff members must avoid solicitation, merely responding to
inquiries of potential purchasers. Rule 3a4-1(4)(iii)(B), 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a4-
1(4)(iii)(B) (1989).
267 An initial step is to identify the "issuer" in a secondary transaction. If the
issuer is the original condominium developer, under the "once a security, always a
security" rationale, then further inquiry is not necessary. If, however, the "issuer" of
an investment contract is whichever party combines into a single offer a condominium
unit and rental services (even if provided by a third party), the issuer of a
condominium security would be the individual unit owner or the owner's real estate
agent. An agent therefore conceivably could qualify as an "associated person of the
issuer," but only in the implausible circumstance that the agent was not paid a
commission. See Rule 3a4-1(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a4-1(a)(2) (1989).
268 Crespi, supra note 264, at 348 (stating that "[t]he SEC staff has consistently
taken the position that registration is required for a person that takes custody of a
client's funds or securities in connection with a transaction) (citing several no-action
letters including one issued for The Stallion Fund, Inc., 1972 WL 7623 (Sept. 13,
1971) ("If a company... maintains custody or possession of client funds or securities
at any stage of a securities transaction," it must register as a securities broker)).
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available to a condominium developer's employees assisting in resales of
the units originally sold by the developer.
269
Once persons are properly classified as securities brokers or dealers (or
their employers2 70 ), a requirement to register applies unless any one of
three exceptions applies:
(1) their business is entirely intrastate;
(2) they deal only in securities that are exempt under the 1934 Act
(whether or not exempt under the 1933 Act); or
(3) a statutory or administrative rule applies exempting the brokers or
dealers from registration.
The first exception, for exclusively intrastate business, is interpreted so
stringently as to virtually eliminate its usefulness. 27 1 Even if an agent were
to market only real estate located in her own state, dealing only with
sellers and buyers resident in the same state, it is difficult to imagine a
business so completely unconnected to the mail, telephone, banking
system, and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce as to qualify as
purely intrastate. 272
269 See HAZEN, supra note 174, at 404 (stating that Rule 3a4-1 "does not extend
safe harbor to an issuer's employees who assist buyers and sellers of the issuers
securities with secondary market transactions.").
270 The registration requirement applies to any "person," a term defined to
include companies, but not to persons who are associated with persons who are
brokers or dealers. Securities Exchange Act § 15(a)(1). The effect is that registration
is required of brokerage firms or individual brokers who are not associated with a
brokerage firm. Lipton, supra note 143, at 905.
271 As one commentator stated, "the administrative interpretations of this
exemption have effectively eliminated the exemption in most instances." Haft, supra
note 153, at 10-21; accord, Crespi, supra note 264, at 356 ("The 'exclusively
intrastate' exemption has been very narrowly construed by the Commission and as a
practical matter is generally unavailable to a broker or dealer"). A broker who relies
on the purely intrastate nature of his or her business to avoid registration is choosing a
highly hazardous course. See Lipton, supra note 143, at 943-47; Wertheimer &
Mark, supra note 177.
272 Use of instrumentalities of interstate commerce, such as telephones, can
defeat the exemption. Securities Exchange Act § 3(a)(17); Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 7105 (July 30, 1963); Hoare & Govett, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter,
1973 WL 9080 (Sept. 28, 1973) ("use of the mails at any stage of a securities
transaction" defeats the exemption), cited in Crespi, supra note 264, at 352 n.28. All
aspects of the negotiation, agreement, and payment must occur within a single state.
Peoples Sec. Co., 39 SEC 641, 653, qff'd, 289 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1961); Guon v.
United States, 285 F.2d 140, 144 (8th Cir. 1960). A single interstate transaction can
defeat the exemption for the broker permanently. EZRA WEISS, REGISTRATION AND
REGULATION OF BROKERS AND DEALERS 15, (1965), cited in Wertheimer & Mark,
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The second exception, for brokers dealing only in exempt securities is
more realistic, but still of no avail to real estate agents in the secondary
condominium market. Exemptions of securities for this purpose (under the
1934 Act) are entirely separate from a seller's exemptions of security
transactions (under the 1933 Act). Thus, even if every condominium
transaction the agent handles has an exemption (under the 1933 Act), the
agent would still have to register.273
The SEC has statutory authority to classify certain interests as
"exempted securities," 274 and has exercised that authority to exempt
securities of cooperative apartment buildings. 275 Recommendations to
supra note 177, at 1227 n.51; Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6859 (July 24,
1962). Interstate business affiliations might defeat the exemption even if a broker's
activities are limited to a single state. In re Capital Funds, Inc., Exchange Act Release
No. 7398 [1964-66 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,131 (Aug. 20,
1964), aff'd sub nom. Capital Funds, Inc. v. SEC, 348 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1965);
Winchester Sec. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1970-71 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 78,119 (April 1, 1971).
273 Wertheim, SEC No-Action Letter, [1972-73 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 79,286 (Dec. 7, 1972), cited in Wertheimer & Marks, supra note 177,
at 1225 (describing a persistent but mistaken notion that brokers are exempt from
registration under the 1934 Act if they sell only securities that are exempt from
registration under the 1933 Act); Lipton, supra note 143, at 965. The 1934 Act
defines certain interests, such as some government, bank trust fund, and insurance
securities, as being "exempted securities," and authorizes the SEC to exempt others,
Securities Exchange Act § 3(a)(12), but this category of "exempted securities" is not
equivalent to the exempt securities or exempt securities transactions under sections 3
and 4 of the 1933 Act.
274 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(12)(A)(v), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(12)(A)(v) (1988) (SEC is authorized to promulgate rules consistent with the
public interest and the protection of investors to exempt securities from the
requirements of the Exchange Act). For example, one rule exempts an "investment
contract security involving the direct ownership of specified residential real property,"
but only "with respect to any transaction by a broker or dealer who, directly or
indirectly, arranges for the extension or maintenance of credit on the security...."
Rule 3a12-5. Because section 15(a) does not require the registration of broker-dealers
who deal exclusively in exempted securities, classifying a security as exempt has the
effect of exempting from registration the broker-dealers who handle transactions in
them. Lipton, supra note 143, at 948.
275 Rule 15a-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-2 (1989). To be exempt, cooperative
apartment shares must be sold by a real estate broker licensed not by the SEC but by
the state or other local jurisdiction. Thus a real estate agent who arranges the sale of
cooperative building stock which is a security under the standards of United Housing
Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), would not have to register if the agent were
properly licensed by the political subdivision where the building was located. Lipton,
supra note 143, at 971 (citing New York State Urban Dev. Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1975 WL 11107 (Oct. 2, 1975)).
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similarly exempt condominium securities, 276 however, have not yielded
any success. 2
77
The only remaining possibility to relieve the burden on real estate
agents is an exemption from broker-dealer registration. Once again,
however, the SEC has chosen to ignore recommendations to exercise its
power2 78 to exempt real estate agents selling condominium units from the
broker-dealer registration requirement 27 9 (which would have an effect very
similar to exempting the securities28 0 ).
Moreover, the SEC staff has resisted a number of proposals to make
compliance more feasible and has imposed restrictions or conditions which
are impractical. 28 1 For example, a real estate agent is allowed to operate in
conjunction with a registered securities broker, but only if the real estate
agent never communicates to a potential investor without the supervision of
the securities broker.2 82 An alternate approach might be for a real estate
agent to refer potential purchasers of a condominium unit to a registered
securities broker, and then share in the commission, but the SEC prohibits
that arrangement also. 283
The result of this analysis is that none of the exceptions are likely to be
helpful to real estate agents handling resales of individual condominium
units. Though some agents in the initial-offerings market are relieved of
276 Rosenbaum, supra note 47, at 812-15 (recommending an alternative to the
exemption proposed by the Dickey Committee).
277 Id. at 812.
278 Securities Exchange Act § 15(a)(2).
279 Rosenbaum, supra note 47, at 812-15. Rosenbaum's proposal would
specifically exempt agents for individual owners of condominium units trying to resell
them.
280 A broker who deals in exempted securities is exempt from broker-dealer
registration, but only if the broker does not deal in any nonexempt securities.
Securities Exchange Act § 15(a)(2). According to one analyst, "[t]he distinction
between the two rulemaking activities is not necessarily significant." Lipton, supra
note 143, at 970.
281 One commentator described the situation as follows: "Despite the
recommendation of the Dickey Committee and the arguments of industry
representatives, the SEC has refused to follow the lead of more realistic state
administrators and exempt licensed real estate sales personnel from broker/dealer
qualification, bonding, reporting, net capital, and Securities Investor Protection
Corporation (SIPC) requirements." Gunnar, supra note 1, at 46; accord, Rosenbaum,
supra note 47, at 798-800.
282 Rosenbaum, supra note 47, at 798 n.51 (citing The Woodmoor Corp., SEC
No-Action Letter [1971-72 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,653 (Feb.
3, 1972)).
283 Id. at 798 n.52 (citing SEC No-Action Letter, Shareholders Recreation
Programs, Inc., 1972 WL 11030 (June 7, 1972)).
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the obligation to register as securities broker-dealers if they are "associated
persons" of the developer, other real estate agents have no viable argument
to escape the registration requirement, if what they sell is classified as a
security. The SEC's policy requiring real estate agents who sell
condominiums with rental pools to register as securities brokers has been
in effect for at least fifteen years, 284 and covers sales on behalf of
developers and also resales by individual unit owners. 285
3. Continuing Regulatory Restrictions and Burdens
Registration is just one aspect of a formidable set of requirements
applicable to brokers trading in securities. 286 Broker-dealers must file
periodic reports on financial condition with the SEC, must limit their
liabilities to a prescribed multiple of their assets,287 and must obtain
insurance to protect customers against loss in the event of brokerage house
failure. 288 Several requirements apply directly to dealings with the
investor, intended to prevent overreaching. Broker-dealers must evaluate
each prospective investor's financial situation and expertise, offering only
investments that are "suitable."289 They are i~esponsible for providing
prospective purchasers with copies of prospectuses in a timely manner, 290
must disclose relationships with the issuer, 291 and must promptly transmit
funds from sales to the sellers or others entitled to the money. Certain
antifraud provisions apply specifically to brokers, in addition to the more
general provisions.
Additional rules, many of which have no practical application to
condominium resales, relate to excessive trading in discretionary
284 See, e.g., The Woodmoor Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-72
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,653 (Feb. 3, 1972) (requiring
registration of a real estate agent involved in the sale of a condominium with rental
arrangement).
285 Rosenbaum, supra note 47, at 801 (citing Don Augustine & Peter M. Fass,
Broker-Dealer Licensing in the Field of Real Estate Syndication, 29 BUS. LAW 369,
375 (1974)).
286 For a summary of the requirements see Wertheimer & Mark, supra note 177,
at 1237-45.
287 Rule lOb-10a.
288 The Securities Investor Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1988).
289 The "know your customers" and "suitability" rules vary according to the self-
regulatory organization governing a particular broker. See generally HAZEN, supra
note 174, § 10.7; Janet E. Kerr, Suitability Standards: A New Look of Economic
Theory and Current SEC Disclosure Policy, 16 PAC. LJ. 805 (1985).
290 Rule 15c2-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-8 (1989).
291 Rule 15c2-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-4 (1989).
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accounts,292 providing confirmations of transactions, 293 and extending
credit to purchasers. 294 Beyond the specific rules, the SEC generally
subjects broker-dealers to standards of conduct substantially more exacting
than those imposed by common law, approaching the status of fiduciaries
for their clients. 295
Perhaps most clearly illustrating the impracticality of complying with
securities regulations are the restrictions on marketing techniques, derived
from the 1933 Act and the rules promulgated under its authority. Because
individual condominium unit resales will virtually never be registered
under the 1933 Act (whether or not the broker is registered), an exemption
will be necessary. Most exemptions preclude or severely restrict
advertising or other solicitation, permitting the broker merely to accept
orders from investors. Securities have long been marketed in that fashion,
but to extend that approach to individual condominium units would be a
major and unpleasant jolt to unit owners, real estate owners, and the entire
resort condominium industry.
Even in the uncommon situation in which a broker or dealer in
securities is exempt from registration, some of those restrictions and
requirements continue to apply. Exempt brokers and dealers are subject,
for example, to the net worth and capital requirements and the special
antifraud rules. 296 Also, the restrictions on advertising and solicitation,
deriving from 1933 Act securities exemptions, apply whether or not the
broker is properly registered under the 1934 Act.
292 Rule 15cl-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7 (1989).
293 Rule 15cl-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240. 15cl-7 (1989).
294 Rule lOb-16, 17 C.F.R. § 240.106-16 (1989); see also Mark Browning &
William A. Jackson, Brokers Beware! Private Cause of Action May Exist Under
Margin Account Disclosure Rules, 13 SEC. REG. L.J. 3 (1985).
295 Randall W. Quinn, Deja Vu All Over Again: The SEC's Return to Agency
Theory in Regulating Broker-Dealers, 1990 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 61, 80 (describing
the "shingle" theory, "agency" theory, and other approaches used by the SEC in
regulating broker-dealers); F. Harris Nichols, The Broker's Duty to His Customers
Under Evolving Federal Fiduciary and Suitability Standards, 26 BUFFALo L. REV.
435, 455 (1977) ("Inexorably and perhaps to his own horror, the broker is being
elevated to the status and, consequentially, the responsibility of a fiduciary.");
HAZEN, supra note 174 § 10.6. (describing the "shingle" theory); see also United
States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979) (securities brokers are highly regulated
and held to high standards of business ethics).
296 Crespi, supra note 264, at 344 n.4.
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4. Practical Implications
The extent and complexity of registering and operating as a securities
broker-dealer make it doubtful that many real estate agents can or will
comply.297 Relatively few agents, those who are heavily involved in sales
of condominium units, perhaps in close affiliation with developers, may
find the economic incentives sufficient to justify compliance. The far
greater number, including virtually all agents in the secondary market, will
be dissuaded. Finally, the typical local real estate agent who is presented
only occasionally with the opportunity to market an individual
condominium unit would not even seriously consider compliance.
As a result, the few brokers who do comply with the extensive panoply
of securities regulations, and also with the applicable state and local real
estate licensing requirements,2 98 will be the only ones legally permitted to
market condominiums with rental services (if they are deemed
"securities"). 299 The supply of such specialists is likely to be limited, and,
accordingly, their fees are likely to be high.
As condominium unit purchasers come to realize that finding a broker
to handle a resale is more difficult and expensive than in the past, they may
hesitate to purchase units initially. Developers then may need to reassure
potential purchasers by undertaking to either provide or arrange for resale
services through a qualified securities broker-dealer.
That scenario, however, presumes that real estate agents will be aware
of the applicability of securities law, and also that they will choose to
either comply or abstain from a portion of their accustomed business. What
is far more likely is that real estate agents will continue listing and showing
condominium units, promoting all of their attractive features, including
297 Rosenbaum, supra note 47, at 798; see also Lipton supra note 143, at 984-85
(stating that "it is difficult not to be overwhelmed by the volume and complexity of
questions that must be explored in order to determine when broker-dealer registration
is necessary" and urging the SEC to make the process more comprehensible).
298 A commentator addressing primarily the initial-offerings market in 1974 noted
that real estate brokers are loath to undertake compliance with securities regulations,
and securities brokerage firms have hesitated to obtain real estate brokers licenses in
each state where a condominium is marketed. As a result, he concluded, there are
apparently only a few organizations in the country which are qualified under all
applicable laws to sell major resort condominium projects. Rosenbaum, supra note 47,
at 798.
299 An underlying premise is that the transactions will continue to be handled by
real estate agents rather than securities broker-dealers. As one commentator has noted
in relation to timeshare interests, potential buyers conceptualize the property as real
estate, not securities, and would not go to a securities broker/dealer. Gunnar, supra
note 1, at 48. The same point is even more plainly applicable to condominium units.
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rental services, and earning commissions. Most will proceed in either
ignorance or disbelief that the complex machinery of securities regulation
could apply to them. Some of the most sophisticated may understand the
legal risks of proceeding without registration as a securities broker-dealer,
but calculate that the risks are worth taking in comparison to the heavy
burdens of attempting to comply.
5. The Occasional Calamity: Securities Law Liability for Real Estate
Agents
For most real estate agents, the first inkling that securities law might
even apply to their marketing of condominium units will be when, in an
occasional instance, they are sued. Their primary concern at that point will
be the extent and standards of liability.
The primary danger is civil actions brought by disgruntled unit
purchasers. One theory available to plaintiffs (illustrated by the Hocking
case) is that the broker misstated or omitted material facts. That type of
action, under Rule lOb-5, the antifraud provision, requires proof of
scienter (intent to deceive or recklessness) and a completed purchase or
sale. A broker might also be liable for aiding and abetting a Rule lOb-5
violation by the unit owner, if the broker knew of the primary violation
and substantially assisted in achieving it.30° A real estate agent who
markets a condominium security using false or misleading information,
without adequately investigating its accuracy, and actively participates in
negotiation, may perhaps be liable for recission under section 12(2) of the
1933 Act.301
300 DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 188-89 (9th Cir. 1987);
Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Moore v.
Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987); Metge
v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986).
Aiding and abetting liability, however, does not extend to 1933 Act violations. See
Hagert v. Glickman, Lurie, Eiger & Co., 520 F. Supp. 1028, 1034 (D. Minn. 1981)
(referring to §§ 11 & 12(2) of the 1933 Act).
301 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988). Liability would depend on classifying the agent as
a "seller," a term that the Supreme Court recently limited to active, direct, and
immediate participants in the sale. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, on remand, 857 F.2d
262 (5th Cir. 1988). Earlier lower court decisions, of uncertain validity after the
Pinter decision, held that a broker who actively touted a security were section 12
"sellers." Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, 448 F.2d 680, 694 (5th Cir.
1971), Quincy Co-operative Bank v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 655 F. Supp. 78, 83 (D.
Mass. 1986). A further issue is whether § 12(2) applies to secondary transactions. A
few courts have ruled that section 12 applies only to distributions and not to
subsequent trading. Ralph v. Prudential-Bache Sec., 692 F. Supp. 1322, 1325 (S.D.
Fla. 1988); SSH Co. v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 678 F. Supp. 1055, 1059 (S.D.N.Y.
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Similar actions may also be available under the 1934 Act's section
15(c), an antifraud provision applicable specifically to broker-dealers, 302
though courts are divided on whether a private plaintiff has standing. 303 A
section 15(c) action probably also requires proof of scienter, but not
necessarily completion of a purchase or sale.304
Moreover, a plaintiff may assert the "shingle theory," that a person
undertakes heightened obligations of fairness and disclosure to customers
merely by holding himself out as a securities broker-dealer. 305 Though
developed by the SEC in its administrative enforcement of standards in the
industry, the theory has also been invoked by private litigants asserting a
violation of antifraud provisions. 306
Even more troubling, however, is the possibility of liability on theories
that do not require proof of either scienter or causation of harm.
Purchasers can obtain remedies merely because the security transaction was
not registered or exempt under the 1933 Act30 7 or because the real estate
agent was not registered or exempt under the broker-dealer provisions of
the 1934 Act.308 Failure to send a proper prospectus or confirmation of
1987); McCowan v. Dean Witter Reynolds, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,423 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (unpublished case). The opposing view, that § 12
applies to all transactions seems more in accord with statutory language. Scotch v.
Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, 709 F. Supp. 95, 98 (M.D. Pa. 1988);
HAZEN, supra note 174, § 7.5 at 318.
302 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1988 Supp. 1989).
303 See HAZEN, supra note 174, § 10.14 at 587-88 (citing numerous decisions
and commentators at each side of the dispute over whether private plaintiffs have
standing to assert § 15(c)).
304Id. at 457.
305 See, e.g., United See. Corp., 15 S.E.C. 719, 727 (1944) (basic principle of
shingle theory is that all customers, regardless of sophistication and knowledge, are
protected by implied representation of fair treatment by securities broker-dealers); see
also Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969). The shingle theory is described
in Quinn, supra note 295, at 72-75. Though the author (an SEC staff attorney) notes
that it has been criticized as excessively broad, and has not been cited specifically by
the SEC in recent years, the shingle theory is justified and "maintains current
vitality." Id. at 80.
306 Quinn, supra note 295, at 81 n.126 (citing Ettinger v. Merrill Lynch Pierce
Fenner & Smith, 835 F.2d 1031, 1033 (3d Cir. 1987)); University Hill Found. v.
Goldman, Sachs & Co., 422 F. Supp. 879, 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)).
307 Securities Act of 1933, § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1988). Liability depends
on whether a broker is a "seller" and whether § 12 applies to the secondary market,
issues discussed supra note 290.
308 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 29, 15 U.S.C. § 78ce (1988); Eastside
Church of Christ v. National Plan, Inc. 391 F.2d 357, 362 (5th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 913 (1968)(customer may void transaction with unregistered broker-
dealer without proof that failure to register caused harm to customer, and without
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transaction is also actionable.3°9 Thus, a condominium purchaser might
bring an action against a real estate agent motivated solely by a downturn
in the value of the condominium purchased, relying entirely on one of
these technical violations, without the need to allege any misstatement or
other morally culpable conduct by the broker. 310
Sanctions from the SEC are also possible, but unlikely. Failure to
register as a securities broker is a violation even though committed without
scienter. 311 The SEC has authority to seek criminal penalties 312 and
injunctions, 313 and can deny registration if it is subsequently sought.314 As
noted elsewhere in this Article, however, the SEC is not likely to pursue
such remedies against real estate agents in the secondary market. The SEC
considers agents selling condominiums with rental arrangements to be
engaged in securities transactions only if the agent is affiliated with the
rental manager, and generally has not taken an active stance on regulation
in this area in recent years.
6. Assessing the Ranifications
As the analysis above demonstrates, extension of securities law to
condominium resales, through a misguided interpretation of the term
"investment contract," will have undesirable, unwarranted, and probably
unintended ramifications on the real estate brokerage and condominium
industries. Theoretically and legally, an extensive array of highly complex
securities law requirements will be imposed on real estate agents, even
though largely irrelevant to their functions.
Adherence to the law would require changes that are not pragmatically
likely. Real estate agents handling an individual condominium unit resale
could assiduously avoid drawing attention to rental services available from
proof of scienter); SEC v. National Executive Planners, 503 F. Supp. 1066, 1973
(M.D.N.C. 1980) (scienter not required in action for failure to register as broker-
dealer).
309 HAZEN, supra note 174, at 591. The confirmation requirement is in Rule lOb-
10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10 (1989).
310 Securities Act of 1933, § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1988); Diskin v.
Lomasney & Co., 452 F.2d 871, 876 (2d Cir. 1961) (recission available to purchaser
who did not receive timely prospectus even though prospectus was received prior to
completion of the transaction); HAZEN, supra note 174, § 7.2 at 279 (referring to
section 12(1) liability).
311 SEC v. National Executive Planners, 503 F. Supp. 1066, 1073 (M.D.N.C.
1980).
312 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1988); see also Guon v. United States, 285 F.2d 140 (8th
Cir. 1960).
313 15 U.S.C. § 78v (1988).
314 15 U.S.C. § 78o (Sb) (1988).
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a third party, but are unlikely to do so. Alternatively, they could decline
the business, referring it instead to a small elite of specialists licensed in
both the securities and the real estate fields, but that course is also
improbable.
The most likely development is that real estate agents will continue to
operate as they have in the past, but will occasionally be "blind-sided" by
a securities law action, even though the agents never had an inkling that
their transactions implicated securities law. Liability may ensue despite
their complete lack of scienter, dishonesty, or other culpable motivation.
This exposure to liability will likely be perceived as arbitrary,
unpredictable, surprising, and unjustified.
VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
The position that condominium units marketed with rental services are
a security even when the services are provided by an unaffiliated third
party is unwarranted and unreasonable, but nevertheless a real threat to the
condominium industry, unit sellers, and real estate brokers. The problem
was created by courts and can best be solved by courts, or by Congress. At
a minimum, however, rule-making by the Securities and Exchange
Commission would substantially alleviate the problems, though it does not
offer a fully satisfactory alternative.
The best, most complete, and most effective solution would be
amendment of the securities acts to clarify that the terms "investment
contract" and "security" do not include condominium units marketed
individually in the secondary market by a person who is not an
"underwriter" (in the well-established technical meaning of that term).
Such a provision would obviate any danger of securities law actions by
either the SEC or private plaintiffs and would extend to actions based on
registration of securities transactions, registration of broker-dealers, and
securities fraud.
Judicial solutions are also possible, though not as effective. The
position of the Ninth Circuit majority in Hocking has fortunately not been
followed by other circuits, and has been received skeptically by one.315
315 Allison v. Ticor Title Ins., 907 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1990) (expressing "grave
doubts about the correctness of Hocking" but resolving the issue before the court on
other grounds). The Hocking decision has been cited in three other decisions, but only
for fairly noncontroversial positions. Long v. Schultz Cattle, 896 F.2d 85 (5th Cir.
1990), cited Hocking for the position that vertical commonality is sufficient. Koch v.
Hawkins, 928 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1991), used Hocking to support the position that, in
evaluating general partnerships as securities, investor expectations and circumstances
should be considered, in addition to the formal rights accorded to general partners.
SEC v. Thomas D. Kienlen Corp., 755 F. Supp. 936 (D. Or. 1991) cited Hocking for
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The Hocking holding should be decisively rejected. Courts should
explicitly disavow the attractive but specious "once a security, always a
security" approach that initially misled the three-judge panel of the Ninth
Circuit. More basically, the need for a nexus between the offeror and any
third party whose activities are sought to be attributed to the offeror should
be expressly established. The nexus requirement is implicit in virtually all
the precedent defining an investment contract and is amply supported by
logical and pragmatic considerations, but has yet to be rigorously analyzed"
and explained in case law. The very few cases to even mention the issue
have been inadequately reasoned and unpersuasive.
The prospects for early judicial resolution of these issues, however, are
not encouraging. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Hocking and the
issue may not reach the Supreme Court in the foreseeable future. The best
result likely to occur is a split of authority among the circuits. The
resulting uncertainty and uneven application of the law would not solve the
problem facing unit sellers, real estate agents, and the condominium
industry.
Rulemaking by the Securities and Exchange Commission offers the
most realistic and effective solution. The position that the SEC presently
takes in litigation is correct and logically based, but not sufficient to
correct the problem until formalized into rules of general application.
Because the primary threat is from private plaintiffs rather than
administrative enforcement, the rules should be modified in such a manner
as to preclude civil actions.
The necessary authority is already provided in section 3(b) of the 1933
Act. The SEC is empowered to create exemptions for classes of securities,
prescribing the terms and conditions, when application of the Act "is not
necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors by
reason of the small amount involved or the limited character of the public
offering." The limitation to issues of $5,000,000 or less is sufficient to
cover virtually any resale of a single condominium unit by an owner who
is not a developer or a rental services manager and not an "underwriter"
(under existing standards for usage of that term).
To address the problems of real estate agents, a companion exemption
under the 1934 Act should be promulgated, again under existing authority.
The exemption could cover the securities or could cover the brokers
dealing in that type of security, producing virtually the same result.
The effect of such exemptions would be substantial, though not as
complete as a legislative amendment. Individual units could be offered and
sold without registration, without meeting the rigorous and burdensome
requirements of existing exemptions, and without triggering the automatic
the principle that the term "offer" is used in a more encompassing sense in securities
law than in the common law of contracts.
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option of purchasers to rescind within one year whenever a nonexempt
unregistered security is sold. Real estate brokers would be protected
against liability for selling securities without registration as broker-dealers
and without compliance with the myriad and complex requirements
imposed on the securities industry.
The inherent limitation of any exemption, of course, is that it concedes
that the underlying transaction involves a security. Hence, civil actions
against unit sellers and real estate agents asserting securities fraud would
still be possible.316 Despite this limitation, SEC action is desirable. It
would solve a large portion of the problem, limit liability to cases
involving scienter, and be uniformly applied nationwide.
Until one of the recommended solutions is adopted the resort
condominium industry will remain exposed to unwarranted and
unreasonable liabilities. Individual unit owners and their real estate brokers
risk occasional civil lawsuits for rescission or damages, with or without
allegation of culpable mental state, if they draw attention to service's
available from unaffiliated third parties.
316 Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 692 (1985) (exemptions
from registration do not include exemptions from antifraud provisions).
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